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I. JURISDICTION STATEMENT 
This is an appeal pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 stemming from the 
Fourth District Court, Millard County, State of Utah, regarding the Court's final Orders 
regarding the Memorandum Decision denying the Motion to Set Aside Judgment on or about 
April 21, 2010, R. p. 4896-4980; the Memorandum Decision denying the Motion to Alter on or 
about September 13, 2010, R. p. 5261-5285; and the Memorandum Decision denying the Motion 
to Alter on or about November 8, 2010, R. p. 5319-5323. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
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1. The above named Appellant, Michael Anthony Archuleta, ("Michael"), was charged with 
capital criminal homicide for the November 22, 1988 murder of Gordon Church 
("Church"). Addendum, Third Amended Information as Exhibit "1 ." 
2. The case proceeded to trial and Michael was represented during the trial by attorney 
Michael Esplin ("Esplin"). 
3. At the conclusion of the guilt phase of the trial, Michael was convicted of criminal 
homicide, a capital offense. 
4. At the conclusion of the sentencing phase of the trial, the death penalty was imposed. Id. 
Warrant of Death as Exhibit "2." 
5. Michael then appealed his conviction and sentence and was again represented by Esplin 
during the direct appeal of his conviction and sentence. 
6. The Utah Supreme Court denied Michael's appeal of his conviction and sentence on or 
about March 25, 1993. Id. State vs. Archuleta, 850 P. 2d 1232 (1993) as Exhibit "3." 
7. Michael then filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, challenging his conviction on the ground that he had been denied his Sixth 
Amendment constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel during the guilt and 
penalty phases of his trial, as well as on the direct appeal of the conviction. R. p.04, 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
8. Attorney Karen Chaney, representing Michael pro bono, filed an Amended Petition for 
Post Conviction Relief on or about August 11, 1994. R. p. 75, Amended Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief. 
9. Eventually, in response to Michael's Amended Petition the State moved for summary 
judgment. R. p.297. 
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10. After arguments, Judge Davis, District Court Judge granted the State's motion for 
summary judgment holding, inter alia, that the claims argued in Michael's petition were 
available to him during the direct appeal; consequently, Michael, having failed to raise 
them on direct appeal, was procedurally barred from raising them in his Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief. R. p. 546, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
11. On or about June 26, 1998, the Utah Supreme Court overturned Judge Davis' judgment ir. 
the District Court without much discussion but referencing three cases, and remanded the 
case back to the District Court for further proceedings. Addendum, Archuleta vs. 
Galetka, 960 P. 2d 399 (1998) as Exhibit "7." 
12. Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873 (1990), one of the three cases cited by the Court in 
overturning Judge Davis's ruling, held that a conviction may be collaterally attacked even 
if the issue was available on appeal if the Appellant can establish unusual circumstances. 
When the trial attorney is the same attorney involved in the appeal, defenses such as 
ineffective assistance of counsel are not waived if not asserted on appeal and thus may be 
pursued in a post conviction relief petition. Id. Dunn v. Cook, 791 P. 2d 873 (1990) as 
Exhibit "8." 
13. Attorney Karen Chaney's license to practice pro hoc vice was revoked because of a 
mental breakdown, thus ending her representation of Michael. See, R. p. 725-726, June 7, 
2001 Ruling and Order; R. p.706, February 13, 2001 Ruling on Motion; R.p.622, 
September 8, 2000 Motion for Extension; and R. p.635, September 20, 2000 Hearing 
Minutes regarding Motion. 
14. Attorney Edward Brass ("Brass") was then appointed as new counsel for Michael on or 
about June 30, 1999. R. p. 728 
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15. Brass then filed Michael's Second Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief ("Second 
Amended Petition"), which was essentially identical in many aspects to the First 
Amended Petition, on or about June 14, 2002, in the Fourth Judicial District Court, 
Millard County. R. p. 888, Second Amended Petition. 
16. The State of Utah, in response to the Second Amended Petition, again moved for 
summary judgment on or about April 1, 2003. R. p. 1255. 
17. A year later, the State moved for rule 11 sanctions against Brass on or about April 12, 
2004. R. p. 1986. 
18. On August 25, 2004, the Trial Court granted partial summary judgment on all claims 
except 33(d)-(t) and 35 (o)-(z), finding that claims 1-30 were procedurally barred 
pursuant to Judge Davis5 previous order. R p. 2226, Ruling on Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
19. On March 21 and 22 and on May 17 and 18, 2006, the Trial Court conducted an 
evidentiary hearing where Ed Brass presented expert testimony alleging trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to present mitigating factors during the penalty phase of the trial. 
See R. p 2753, 2791, 2793, 2891 (transcript), and 2907 (transcript). 
20. The Parties then submitted closing arguments on September 14, 2006 and October 31, 
2006. See, R p. 2990, 3009. 
21. On or about January 22, 2007, Judge Eyre, after taking evidence and closing arguments 
on the mitigation issue, denied the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief holding that 
mitigating evidence presented at the hearing contradicted the trial counsel's trial strategy, 
as well as Michael's own testimony that he did not inflict any of the injuries to Gordon 
Church. R. p. 3338, Ruling on Petition. 
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22. On or about March 9, 2007, the Appellant appealed the decisions of the Court regarding 
the State's Motion for Summary Judgment, which is pending before the Court. R p. 
3402. 
23. The undersigned was appointed as counsel for Michael, and submitted a Motion to Set 
Aside Judge' Eyre's August 25, 2004 and January 22, 2007 Judgments and Motion for a 
New Trial on or about July 17, 2009. R p. 3505-3562. 
24. Judge Eyre issued a Memorandum Decision denying the Motion to Set Aside Judgment 
on or about April 21, 2010. R p. 4896-4980. 
25. Appellant filed his Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment on or about May 4, 2010. R p. 
995-5004. 
26. A Memorandum Decision was filed denying the Motion to Alter on or about September 
13,2010. R. p.5261-5285. 
27 Appellant filed his Notice to Appeal on or about September 20, 2010. R p.5289-5290. 
28. Appellant filed his Second Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment on or about September 
23, 2010. R. p. 5291-5292. 
29. A Memorandum Decision was filed on or about November 8, 2010, R. p.5319-5323, 
denying the Second Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. 
HI. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The findings of fact found in the Utah Supreme Court's mandatory appeal, "Archuleta I," 
Addendum as Exhibit "3"; Judge Davis' order granting summary judgment, R 546; Judge Eyre's 
order granting summary judgment, R 2226; and Judge Eyre's denial of post-conviction relief, R. 
3338, adequately for the purpose of this appeal, provides a summary of the factual matters before 
the Court. As such, a factual summary will not be further provided herein. 
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IV. STATEMENT OF ISSUES/ PRESERVATION OF ISSUES 
I. Whether Michael is entitled to the relief sought in his Motion to Set Aside the 
Trial Judge's August 25, 2004 and January 22, 2007 rulings and judgments and/or his 
Motion for New Trial. 
II. Whether or not the trial judge applied the correct standard^ in addressing Appellant's 
Motion to Set Aside. 
III. Whether or not the Trial Court erred in denying the Appellant's Rule 59 Motion to Alter 
or Amend Judgment by allowing him to conduct discovery to address the Rule 60 Motion 
to Set Aside. 
IV. Whether or not Michael's mistaken reliance on Brass to properly investigate and pursue 
his post-conviction petition justifies relief from the Judge pyre's August 25, 2004 and 
January 22, 2007 rulings and judgments. 
V. Whether or not Brass provided ineffective assistance of counsel or was grossly negligent 
by failing to investigate, pursue and present the following claims regarding the 
Appellant's Post-Conviction Relief: 
1. Issues regarding Wood's confession to Jorgensen. 
2. Issues regarding David Homer's testimony. 
3. Issues regarding the failure to contact Gary Hawkins and others regarding 
subsequent confessions of Lance Wood. 
4. Issues regarding whether Michael is exempt from the death penalty as provided 
for by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) andjUtah Code §77-15a-101. 
5. Issues regarding Esplin's failure to produce evidence regarding Mr. Wood's 
personality and psychological assessments. 
6. Issues regarding Esplin's failure to obtain Experts !to support Michael's defense 
against the State's charges. 
7. Issues regarding the mental breakdown of the State's forensic pathologist. 
8. Issues regarding Brass' failure to amend the pleadings. 
VI. Whether Brass prejudiced Michael by introducing prejudibial, rather than mitigating 
evidence in his Post-Conviction Relief Petition. 
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VII. Whether "cumulative error" undermines any confidence that that Michael received a fair 
trial or competent representation regarding post-conviction matters; therefore entitling 
Michael to a new trial and/or penalty phase of his trial. 
VIII. Whether or not the death sentence should be outright reversed based upon a lack of 
confidence that that Michael received a fair trial or competent representation regarding 
post-conviction matters. 
IX. Whether or not Michael has exhausted his State remedies. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellant filed a petition for post conviction relief challenging his conviction and 
sentence alleging numerous claims that during his criminal trial, his rights as guaranteed by 
Article I, Sections 7, 9, 10 and 12 of the Utah Constitution and the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States were violated. Pursuant to the State's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and without fully addressing Michael's substantive claims and ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims, the Trial Court on August 25, 2004, R. p.2226, and on January 22, 2007, R. p. 
338, dismissed Michael's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief Appellant then filed a Motion to 
Set Aside Judge Eyre's ruling based upon excusable neglect, gross negligence and in ineffective 
assistance of counsel The Trial Court denied the Appellant's Rule 60(b) Motion. For the 
reasons stated herein, the Trial Court erred in its conclusions and applied the wrong standard in 
reaching its conclusions. This Court should grant the Appellant his relief by granting him a new 
trial and/or sentencing in that the evidence supports Michael's claims; or in the alternative, this 
Court should remand the case to the district court for the purpose of addressing the Appellant's 
claims using the proper criteria and standards as indicated herein. 
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VI. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. This Court Should Set Aside the Judgments of the District Court Pursuant to Rule 
60(b) 
1. Introduction 
In this matter, Michael sought an order setting aside the Trial Court's August 25, 2004 
and January 22, 2007 rulings denying Michael's post-conviction petition. In determining 
whether this motion should be granted, this Court 
must not lose sight of the fact that the case before us is a post-conviction petition seeking 
habeas corpus relief from a death penalty sentence. A post-conviction proceeding is a 
proceeding of constitutional importance, over which the judiciary has supervisory 
responsibilities due to our constitutional role. In discharging this role, we must recognize 
the stakes involved in post-conviction proceedings, take appropriate steps to satisfy 
ourselves of the reliability of convictions and death sentences, and ensure that a 
petitioner's fundamental rights are adequately protected. 
Memies v. Galetka, 150 P. 3d 480, 503 (2006). 
Motions to set aside are allowed by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b), which provides 
as follows: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect;... or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation 
of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for 
reason[ ] (1), . . . not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding 
was entered or taken. . . . The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment 
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
[Emphasis added.] 
For the reasons found herein, Michael is entitled to have Judge Eyre's ruling denying 
Post-conviction Relief set aside pursuant to Rule 60 (b). It is important to note that the Appellant 
is seeking relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) based on three alternative grounds: 1) mistake, 
inadvertences, surprise or excusable neglect; 2) counsel provided ineffective assistance of 
counsel; and 3) counsel was grossly negligent. As the following demonstrates, the Appellant is 
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entitled to relief on all three grounds justifying relief from Judge Eyre's ruling denying post-
conviction relief. 
2. The Trial Court Applied the Wrong Standard in Determining Whether Michael 
was entitled to Rule 60 Relief 
To obtain relief from a judgment or an order, Rule 60 requires the person to pursue the 
relief by Motion. See Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60 (b). Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7 
states that an "application to the court for an order shall be by motion which . . . shall be made 
in accordance with this rule. A motion shall be in writing and state succinctly and with 
particularity the relief sought and the grounds for the relief sought." [Emphasis added.] Rule 7 
continues by providing that "motions . . . shall be accompanied by a supporting memorandum." 
Rule 7 (c)(1). Then Rule 7 sets up a briefing schedule to properly bring the issue before the 
Court for its ruling. Rule 7(c)(3)(A) mandates the content the memorandum supporting the 
motion should contain. Although the language of paragraph 7(c)(3)(A) seems to be specific to 
the content necessary for a Motion for Summary judgment, the rule, as stated and quoted above, 
also states that all motions must comply with Rule 7. If the "content" requirements of Rule 7 
apply, then the memorandum should "contain a statement of material facts . . . which shall be 
separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits 
or discovery materials." In fact, Rule 7 contemplates that any fact not "controverted by the 
responding party" is "deemed admitted." Id. The Rule then mandates that after the briefing has 
been submitted, then the matter is to be submitted to the Court and the Court at that point may 
conduct a hearing. See, Rule 7(d) and (e). The Court may then schedule a hearing to allow the 
parties to make oral arguments or to allow presentation of evidence regarding facts which are 
disputed. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 43 provides that upon a motion "based on facts not 
appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective 
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parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or 
depositions." 
In analyzing whether the Trial Court was in error, this Court should be mindful of the 
posture of the case and the issues that were before the Trial Court. The Appellant initiated this 
action by filing a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. The State sought and obtained summary 
judgment for every claim found in the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief with the single 
exception being the claim regarding whether or not trial counsel provided adequate mitigating 
investigation. R. p. 2226. Mr. Brass without any legal justification and without Appellant's 
authority failed to provide responses to the State's Motion for Summary Judgment essentially all 
of the Appellant's arguments, which resulted in default on virtually all of the Appellant's claims 
found in his Petition. R. p. 1600 and 2226. In this matter, the Appellant filed a Rule 60(b) 
Motion for Relief from Judge Eyre's two rulings, August 25, 2004 and January 22, 2007, based 
upon Brass' ineffective assistance of counsel and gross negligence in allowing default judgment. 
This Rule 60(b) Motion complied with Rule 7 in all respects by containing evidentiary support 
for many of the claims which Brass allowed to be dismissed by summary judgment. In this 
Motion, the Appellant complied with Rule 7 by clearly and succinctly stating the facts upon 
which he relied, and then supported these facts by affidavits and by citations from sworn 
testimony found in the record. The Respondent did not dispute the facts nor did he file any 
counter-affidavits creating any facts in controversy. The Respondent did not argue, nor did the 
Trial Court find, that the Appellant failed to comply with the rules of civil practice regarding 
presenting a proper motion before the Court. The State essentially filed no competing affidavits 
to the Appellant's factual allegations, nor did it request leave of the Court to pursue discovery or 
to dispute the evidence presented in support of the Appellant's Rule 60(b) Motion. The 
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Respondent did not request a hearing pursuant to Rule 7 or Rule 43, nor did the Court set an 
evidentiary hearing. In essence, the Rule 60(b) Motion never went past the motion stage. Upon 
Michael's presentation of the evidence supporting his Rule 60 Motion, the State had the burden 
to contradict the Michael's evidence supporting his Rule 60 Motion. Since the State failed to 
object or contradict the evidence, the Trial Court, thus this Court, should consider the evidence 
the Appellant presented as admitted and true. 
In support of his Rule 60 Motion, Michael presented his affidavit, in which the affidavit 
of Mr. Brass concurred and which the state did not dispute, that he never requested or otherwise 
authorized Mr. Brass not to pursue the issues raised in his petition for post-conviction relief. See 
Affidavit of Michael Archuleta, Addendum, Exhibit "29," R. p. 5032-5046, and Ed Brass, 
Addendum, Exhibit "15," R. p. 5057-5226. 
Instead of disputing Appellant's factual allegations properly submitted in support of his 
motions, the Respondent's Opposition to the Appellant's Motion for Rule 60 relief argued that 
Appellant must "prove prior post-convictions counsel's ineffectiveness before he would be 
entitled to rule 60(b) relief," R. p. 4648-4751 Respondent's Opposition p. 7. In addition, 
Respondent's Opposition states that Menzies "makes clear that Archuleta had to prove that prior 
post-conviction counsels were ineffective before the Court could grant relief." Id, Respondent's 
Opposition p. 2 There is no support for this position in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
regarding motion practice. 
The Respondent's reasoning and the Trial Court's rulings were in error in that they 
confused the proof and the necessary analysis required regarding a Post Conviction Relief 
Petition with the proof and analysis required regarding whether or not Appellant's Rule 60 
Motion should be granted. Clearly, relief pursuant to a Post-Conviction Relief Petition can be 
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based upon a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Furthermore, relief pursuant to the Rule 
60 Motion can also be based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. The analysis and standard 
of ineffective assistance of counsel in these two actions are completely separate and distinct. 
The focus of the Trial Court on the issue of whether or not Michael received ineffective 
assistance of counsel as it relates to his Rule 60 motion for relief should have been on whether or 
not Mr. Brass failed to investigate and pursue viable claims to obtain Post-Conviction Relief, 
not whether or not the claims raised "proved" that Michael was entitled to post-conviction relief 
In fact the Trial Court held as follows: 
Based upon the approach employed by the Supreme Court in assessing the Rule 60(b) 
motion in the Memies case, it is the Court's considered view that the burden of proof 
applicable to Petitioner's ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel claims is more 
than simply a pleading standard. Instead, it requires Petitioner to apply the Strickland 
standard and demonstrate, with respect to each of his claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, that Brass' representation was objectively deficient and that, but for Brass' 
deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of Petitioner's 
post-conviction proceeding would have been different. 
R. p. 4896, at p. 38. 
In analyzing the issues, it is essential to keep in mind the posture of the case. The 
Appellant had filed a "motion" with appropriate supporting documents taking the position that 
the Trial Court's summary judgment should be set aside. Memies Court stated, with regard to a 
district court's review of a Rule 60(b) motion, as follows: 
It is well established that 60(b) motions should be liberally granted because of the 
equitable nature of the rule. Therefore, a district court should exercise its discretion in 
favor of granting relief so that controversies can be decided on the merits rather than on 
technicalities. 
Memies v. Galetka, 150P.3d480, (Utah 2006), quotingMusselman, 667P.2dat 1055-56. 
The Memies Court also took the opportunity to remind trial courts that "the law should 
not be so blind and unreasoning that where an injustice has resulted the [plaintiff] should be 
without remedy." Id. at 503, quoting Martinez v. Smith, 602 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1979). This 
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Court instructed district courts that while they do have discretion in determining Rule 60(b) 
motions that their "discretion is tempered by the fact that the rule is designed to be remedial and 
must be liberally applied." Id. 
The burden imposed by the Trial Court in this matter exceeds what is required by a Rule 
60(b) Motion and the other civil rules as they relate to motion practice. In other words, to be 
entitled to Rule 60(b) relief, Michael simply needs to present viable claims, properly supported, 
as Rule 7 requires, that if proven would allow him to ultimately prevail. Memies supports this 
assertion when it held that "[e]ven 'general denials' that would allow a litigant to prevail if 
proven are sufficient," and when it stated that "[w]hile the record is far from fully developed 
with regard to Menzie's claims..., [he] is not required to prove any of his claims or meet an 
evidentiary threshold in order to demonstrate his claims have merit." Id. at 518, quoting 
Erickson, 882 P 2d at 1149. Furthermore, this Court declared that a litigant seeking rule 60(b) 
relief based upon ineffective assistance of counsel or gross negligence only "must proffer some 
defense of at least sufficient ostensible merit as would justify a trial on the issue thus raised " Id. 
at 517 quoting Downey State Bank v. Major-BIakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507, 510 (Utah 1976). 
The Court expressly recognized that proof at this posture "does not set an overly 
burdensome threshold.. " id., and expounded that, in seeking relief under Rule 60(b), "where a 
party presents a clear and specific proffer of a defense that, if proven, would [warrant relief] by 
the claimant... it has adequately shown a nonfrivolous and meritorious defense." Id. at 17 
(emphasis added), quoting Lund, 2000 UT 75, \ 29, 11 P.3d 277. The threshold requirement is 
whether or not the Appellant has alleged in his Rule 60 Motion that he has "meritorious" claims 
regarding the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief of which Brass was ineffective or grossly 
negligent in investigating and pursing. The Trial Court erred by obligating the Appellant to 
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establish proof that the claims he presented in his Rule 60(b) motion proved he was entitled to 
post-conviction relief. 
The Trial Court in the present case was critical of Appellant for not conducting discovery 
to prove that he was entitled to post-conviction relief See, R p. 5261-5285, Memorandum 
Decision beginning at Section C. The Court held that the Appellant should have known pursuant 
to Menzies that discovery was available. However, Menzies supports the proposition that 
discovery is available after the court grants the Rule 60(b) Motion, but not the position that 
discovery should be conducted to "prove" he is entitled to post-conviction relief at the motion 
stage. Discovery in Menzies was conducted while the Trial Court was considering the Post-
Conviction Petition not when it was considering the Rule 60 Motion. See, Menzies at p. 518-
520. In Menzies, after default and after the Rule 60 motion, the focus shifted to Mr. Brass' 
actions regarding the investigation and pursuit of the post-conviction petition. After Menzies 
filed his Rule 60 Motion with the appropriate affidavits, the State disputed the facts regarding 
Brass5 ineffective assistance of counsel in pursing the petition for post-conviction relief and 
sought discovery to defend against the Rule 60 Motion. Id at para. 44. Based upon the State's 
Motion, the Court then set an evidentiary hearing, apparently by the authority found in Rule 43, 
"in order to obtain evidence relating to communications between Brass and Menzies during the 
period of Brass' representation." Id. A hearing was for the singular purpose of addressing Mr. 
Brass' action in pursuing Mr. Menzies' post-conviction relief so that the court could address the 
Rule 60(b) Motion, not whether Mr. Menzies could prove there were claims which "proved" that 
he was entitled to post-conviction relief. In the case-in-hand, the State did not dispute any of the 
Appellant's factual allegations, failed to seek discovery and failed to request an evidentiary 
hearing. Thus, the Trial Court was obligated to accept the evidence Michael presented as true. 
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The Appellant's evidence clearly supported the proposition that Brass provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel and/or was grossly negligent in allowing default and in pursuing any and 
all viable claims that Michael had regarding his post-conviction action. 
The Appellant's Rule 60 Motion requested that the Trial Court's judgments granting 
summary judgment, mostly by default, be opened so that he could pursue viable claims that Mr. 
Brass failed to pursue or investigate. The evidence provided was simply to demonstrate there 
was support for the claims that Brass allowed to be dismissed by summary judgment. The 
Appellant, at this posture of the case, clearly supported the proposition, thus proved, that Mr. 
Brass was grossly negligent or provided ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to pursue 
viable claims for post-conviction relief. 
The Appellant certainly has established from the existing record that these claims should 
have been explored but were not. Accordingly, this Court should grant the Appellant relief from 
Judge Eyre's summary judgment rulings as indicated herein 
3. The Trial Court erred in denying Appellant's Rule 59 Motion 
In response to the Trial Court's ruling denying his Rule 60(b) Motion, on May 3, 2010, 
the Appellant filed a Motion pursuant to Rule 59 asking the Court to allow him to pursue 
discovery and also requested an evidentiary hearing to address the Rule 60 (b) Motion. R. 4988-
4989. This motion was supported by the affidavit of James K. Slavens, Esq. R. p. 4990. The 
Appellant based this request to supplement the evidence through discovery because, as provided 
in the previous section, the Trial Court had assessed the Appellant the burden of "proving" that 
he was entitled to post-conviction relief in determining whether or not the Rule 60(b) Motion to 
Set Aside should be granted. The Court denied the Appellant's Rule 59 Motion. R. p. 5261. As 
the following demonstrates, the Trial Court's denial of his Rule 59 ruling was in error. 
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Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59 allows for a party to move the Court to alter or amend 
the judgment when it is necessary to take additional testimony or where there is newly 
discovered evidence, so long as the motion is filed no later than 10 days after entry of the 
judgment. The Appellant's motion clearly complied with the time requirements of Rule 59. 
Michael's July 2009 Motion to Set Aside focused on claims that his previous attorney, Ed Brass, 
provided ineffective assistance of counsel on behalf of the Appellant for the reasons stated in the 
Motion. As provided previously herein, the Trial Court's denial of Appellant's Motion to Set 
Aside was based, significantly, on the fact that Michael had not conducted discovery. 
Particularly, the Trial Court made the finding that "[Appellant] provides the Court with no 
evidence concerning the actual extent of Brass's investigation on these issues. Nor has Petitioner 
shown that Brass did not, in fact, investigate what Wood now attests to in his affidavit. Without 
this evidence, the Court cannot reasonably conclude that Brass performed deficiently." R. p. 
4896, Memorandum Decision, p. 50. The Court found similarly as to each of the points raised in 
the July Motion to Set Aside. See generally, Id. 
However, the explanation for the lack of any statements by Brass with regard to his 
investigation of the relevant issues in this matter was simple: Brass refused to provide any 
information. The undersigned left several messages for Mr. Brass requesting that Brass discuss 
with him his position on each of the issues that were raised in Michael's July 2009 Motion to Set 
Aside. However, Mr. Brass never returned any of those calls. R. 4990-4994, Affidavit of James 
K. Slovens, para. 15. The Federal Public Defender's Office also attempted to contact Brass to 
determine his position regarding the issues raised in Appellant's Motion. Id. at 17. Again, Brass 
refused to return any calls. Id. at para. 16. In fact, after the Court's ruling denying the 
Appellant's Rule 60(b) Motion, Appellant's counsel again attempted to contact Mr. Brass, and 
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again with no success. Id. at para. 18. Finally, the Appellant was able to obtain an affidavit 
from Mr. Brass, which was filed on August 4, 2010, which conclusively answered the Trial 
Court's question regarding the "actual extent of Brass' investigation on these issues." The 
Appellant established that Brass had failed to investigate and pursue Michael's claims. R. p. 
5057, Addendum, Exhibit "15." 
Regarding the Appellant's Rule 59 Motion, the Trial Court held that "[nevertheless, even 
excusing and considering Brass's affidavit, Petitioner still has not shown that the Rule 60 (b) 
proceedings should be reopened." R. p. 5261, at p. 15. The Trial Court also denied the 
Appellant's request that he be allowed to pursue discovery: "because ordinary prudence would 
have guarded against Petitioner's misapprehension that compulsory discovery could be used to 
obtain evidence in support of a Rule 60 (b) motion, he is not entitled to the relief he seeks under 
Rule 59 based upon surprise." R. p. 5261, at p. 20. Implied in the Trial Court's rulings is that the 
Court did grant the Rule 59 Motion to the point of at least admitting Mr. Brass' and Michael's 
Affidavits. See also, R. p. 5253, wherein the Trial Court denied the Respondent's Motion to 
Strike Mr. Brass' Affidavit. 
First, the Trial Court should have granted the Appellant's Rule 59 Motion for the reasons 
that are contained herein. Second, as the following demonstrates, the Trial Court should have 
granted the Appellant's Rule 60 Motion based upon the additional information provided in Mr. 
Brass' and Michael's Affidavits and considered by the Trial Court regarding the Rule 59 
Motion. 1 
1 To understand the Trial Court's ruling as references to the Claim number, the Appellant had 
the following claims: (1) Brass failed to fully explore and present a claim under Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) in relation to Lance Wood's confessions or, in the alternative, 
failed to investigate trial counsel's ineffective assistance in relation to Wood's confession; (2) 
Brass failed to properly investigate, pursue, and present evidence indicating that witness David 
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Considering Mr. Brass' Affidavit, the Trial Court found as follows: 
With respect to claim 1 concerning Brass's alleged failure to investigate Lance Wood's 
"confession," claim 2 concerning Brass's failure to raise a Brady claim, a newly 
discovered evidence claim, and a suppression of evidence claim in relation to David 
Homer's alleged recantation, and claim 3 concerning Brass's alleged failure to investigate 
statements made by Gary Hawkins in relation to Wood's participation in the homicide of 
Church, even if Brass's affidavit shows that his performance was professionally deficient, 
the Court independently determined with respect to each of these claims that Petitioner 
had failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard. See April 21, 2010 
Mem. Decision at 50-51, 53-54, and 57-60. Thus, the facts alleged in Brass's affidavit 
would not have altered the Court's decision on these Rule 60(b) claims. 
R. p. 5261 at p. 16. 
The Trial Court's ruling, even if it is correct that the Appellant has the burden of 
"proving" that he is entitled to post-conviction relief before his Rule 60 (b) motion could be 
granted, simply ignores the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Sears. See Discussion 
found in Section A6, which follows. 
As to Claim four, the Trial Court, citing on Jacobs v. State, 20 P.2d 382 (2001), ruled that 
Mr. Brass reasonably relied upon Dr. Gummow and Dr. Cunningham in not pursuing an Atkins' 
claim. R. p. 5253, p. at 16-17. Regarding this issue, Mr. Brass stated in his affidavit that "I did 
not recall asking for their evaluation regarding the issue of whether or not Michael Archuleta 
Homer recanted his testimony; (3) Brass failed to properly investigate, pursue, and present 
evidence concerning the testimony of Gary Hawkins; (4) Brass failed to properly investigate, 
pursue, and present evidence concerning a claim of exemption from the death penalty on the 
basis of mental retardation; (5) Brass failed to properly challenge trial counsel's representation 
on the ground that trial counsel did not call an expert to compare the psychological profiles of 
Petitioner and Wood; (6) Brass failed to properly challenge trial counsel's representation on the 
ground that trial counsel did not retain a blood spatter expert, an expert to testify that Church was 
dead or had lost consciousness prior to any torture or abuse, or an expert to testify that the 
battery cables used against Church would not have produced a significant electrical shock; (7) 
Brass failed to properly investigate, pursue, and present evidence that the State committed a 
Brady violation in failing to reveal that Martha Kerr, a Forensic Pathologist for the Utah State 
Crime Lab who testified for the State concerning blood evidence, suffered a mental breakdown 
prior to her testimony; (8) Brass failed to amend the second amended petition to include claims 1 
through 30 that were previously, but erroneously, denied by the Court as procedurally barred; 
and (9) Brass prejudiced Petitioner during the post-conviction mitigation case by presenting 
evidence that was more harmful than helpful. 
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suffered from mental retardation. Rather, we directed the experts, who are both well experienced 
in capital litigation, to investigate any and all possible mental health defenses for Mr. Archuleta." 
Addendum, Exhibit "15," R. p. 5057 at para. 17(c). As the Trial Court recognized, Jacobs stands 
for the proposition that an attorney can reasonably rely on experts' "conclusions." However, in 
Jacobs, experts were actually retained during the criminal trial to address the competency of the 
Defendant. Id. at para. 4. That is not the case in this situation. Neither Esplin, Michael's 
criminal trial attorney, nor Brass retained an expert for the specific purpose of addressing 
whether or not Michael suffers from mental retardation. This is quite different than the facts of 
Jacobs. 
In Jacobs, experts were actually retained for the purpose of determining Jacobs' 
competency. The fact of the matter is, Brass was the attorney and had the obligation to 
investigate and pursue viable claims, not to just send the case to an expert with instructions to 
"tell me what defenses may be available." An attorney cannot satisfy his obligations by simply 
asking an expert, not even an expert relating to mental retardation, to evaluate his/her client and 
report what legal claims should be pursued based upon that evaluation. Mr. Brass had the 
obligation to pursue and/or eliminate whether or not Atkins provided a viable claim. 
As to Claim 5, the Court ruled that "[w]ithout a definitive showing that a comparison of 
Petitioner's and Wood's psychological profiles constitutes evidence contradicting the State's 
theory of the case, Brass's affidavit simply does not show that his performance in representing 
Petitioner in this respect was deficient." R. p. 5261 at p. 18. The Court continued by arguing 
that even if Brass' performance was deficient, Michael failed to establish that he was prejudiced. 
Id. Again, without restating in detail the Appellant's argument, the standard of proof, in light of 
Sears and the cases cited herein, was too stringent. Michael "might be prejudiced by his 
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counsel's failures" to have consulted an expert in order to determine whether or not the claim 
should have been pursued. 
As to Claim 6, first, the Trial Court held that Brass was not obligated to pursue "claims 
that were procedurally barred under the PCRA." Id. at p. 19. For the reasons stated in the 
Appellant's initial Appellant's Brief and in Section 8 below, starting on page 69, Claim 6 is not 
procedurally barred. Second, the Trial Court held that "Petitioner had to show that trial counsel 
was ineffective in failing to hire the foregoing experts." Id. at 19. Again, this ruling applied an 
inappropriate burden and is contrary to Sears where it held that defense counsel is obligated to 
retain an expert to assist in determining what theory to pursue. The fact that defense counsel 
hired no expert regarding the blood evidence amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel, 
especially since the "blood evidence" was the very evidence used to determine Michael's 
involvement in the murder. 
As to Claim 7, the Trial Court held that the Appellant had failed to establish the prejudice 
prong of Strickland. Id. at 20. Without restating the arguments contained herein, the Trial 
Court's standard of proof was too onerous and is opposite to the holding in Sears. 
The Trial Court had also erroneously based its denial of Appellant's Rule 60(b) Motion in 
finding that "[b]ecause Petitioner has neither argued nor demonstrated that a hearsay exception 
applies that would allow for the admissibility of Steele's and Voas's affidavits, Petitioner cannot 
show that he has any basis on which to argue that Brass was ineffective in not raising either a 
Brady or newly discovered evidence claim based upon Homer's statements." R p. 4896, 
Memorandum Decision, /?. 55. However, the Appellant had supplemented the July 2009 Motion 
to Set Aside with the Affidavits of Mr. Jeffery Homer and Mr. Les Mabry. Copies of the 
Affidavits were attached as Exhibit "B" to the Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Alter, 
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which had previously been filed R p 4995 
Even if the Trial Court's initial decision denying Michael's Rule 60(b) Motion was 
correct, the Trial Court after reviewing Michael's, Brass', Jeffrey Horner's and Les Mabrey's 
affidavits should have granted Michael his Rule 60(b) relief At least, the Trial Court should 
have allowed Michael to conduct discovery 
4. Trail Court Failed to Address Whether or not Brass was Grossly Negligent 
The Court never addressed the Appellant's claim that Mr Brass was grossly negligent as 
alleged in his pursuit of the Appellant's Motion for Rule 60 Relief In Menzie, the Court held 
that "relief under 60(b)(6) may also be sought where a lawyer's performance is grossly negligent 
and therefore not excusable under rule 60(b)(1) " Menzies at p 515 This is important because a 
claim of "grossly negligent" is not analyzed pursuant to Strickland Although the Appellant 
sought relief based upon this claim, the Trial Court never analyzed this additional basis for relief 
For the reasons provided herein, the Appellant has established that Brass was grossly negligent 
This Court should either find that the evidence supports the proposition that Brass was grossly 
negligent or remand the case to the Trial Court for the purpose of addressing whether or not the 
Appellant is entitled to relief in that Brass was grossly negligent 
5 Michael Mistakenly Relied on Brass' Representation 
To obtain relief under 60(b)(1), a party must show that the judgment was the result of 
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect," that the motion for relief from judgment 
was timely, and that the case involves a meritorious defense or an issue worthy of adjudication 
Menzies, 150 P 3d 480 (2006) As this brief indicates, Mr Brass clearly failed to investigate, 
pursue and present claims supporting Michael's post-conviction relief, thus he provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel and/or was grossly negligent Michael should be excused for 
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his mistaken reliance on Brass to properly investigate, pursue and present all relevant claims 
Clients who rely on counsel who fail to perform are entitled to relief under 60(b)(1). Michael 
mistakenly relied on Brass to provide the legal representation to which he was clearly entitled. 
Michael's reasonable reliance on Brass, coupled with his status as a death row inmate, explains 
his inability to litigate his post-conviction relief claims himself; therefore, he qualifies for relief 
under 60(b)(1). As articulated herein, Michael is entitled to Rule 60(b) relief in that he has 
meritorious claims, which, if proved, would prevent the State from executing him and entitle 
Michael to post-conviction relief 
In Memies, the Utah Supreme Court held that "it is well established that 60(b) Motions 
should be liberally granted because of the equitable nature of the rule." Id. At 502. Therefore a 
district court should exercise its discretion in favor of granting relief so that a controversy can be 
decided on the merits rather than on technicalities. In addressing the appropriate "reason," 
pursuant to Rule 60 (b) that applies to a Motion to Set Aside for ineffective assistance of counsel 
in a post-conviction relief, the Supreme Court held "that rule 60(b)(6) applies to Memies' 
arguments [that the judgment should be set aside] and therefore do not address Memies' 
arguments under the other asserted subsections of rule 60(b)." Id. at 502 
A "judgment entered due to attorney misconduct may be set aside under this subsection 
[60(b)(1)] only if the conduct is excusable. " Memies, 150 P. 3d 507, citing Mini Spas v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 733 P.2d 130. 132 (Utah 1987). The focus of the Appellant's position regarding this 
aspect of the Appellant's request for relief is on the words "if the conduct is excusable." The 
rule, nor this holding, does not specify whether or not the "conduct" refers to the attorney or to 
the person the attorney is representing. The question then is whether the Court's analysis should 
focus on Michael's conduct or Brass' conduct regarding the Appellant's Rule 60(b) Motion. If 
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the Court's focus is on Brass' conduct, a judgment under this provision should be upheld only if 
"the attorney exercised 'due diligence,' defined as conduct that is consistent with the manner in 
which a reasonably prudent attorney under similar circumstances would have acted " Id 
The Appellant is not arguing as to his Rule 60(b)(1) motion for relief that Brass' actions were 
excusable—in fact just the opposite However, Rule 60(b)(1) allows and contemplates relief if 
Michael's conduct was excusable In this situation, Michael excusably relied upon Brass to 
pursue his claims, but he did not Michael, although he attempted, had no means nor possessed 
the financial resources to verify that Brass was pursuing his claims Addendum, Exhibit "29," R 
5032, Affidavit of Michael Archuleta 
The Trial Court in this matter found that the Appellant's Rule 60(b)(1) was untimely 
See, R p 4896, at p 21 Rule 60(b)(1) does require the motion to be brought within three 
months However, in this matter, the Appellant seeks relief based upon Ed Brass' negligence, 
gross negligence and ineffective assistance of counsel The Appellant has presented sufficient 
evidence to support such a finding regarding Mr Brass' representation Any untimeliness of 
motions was not through any fault of the Appellant but because of the fault of his attorney 
In State v. Johnson, 635 P 2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court adopted a 
procedural mechanism to restore a right to appeal when the defendant was prevented from 
bringing a timely appeal through no fault of his own The Court provided relief from ineffective 
assistance of counsel by directing the defendants to file a motion for resentencing in the trial 
court so that the thirty-day time period for bringing an appeal set forth in rule 4(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure would begin to run anew Id at 38 Johnson was overturned in 
Manning v. State, 122 P 3d 628 (Utah 2005), where the Court held 
Accordingly, we hold that, upon a defendant's motion, the trial or sentencing court may 
reinstate the time frame for filing a direct appeal where the defendant can prove, based on 
26 
facts in the record or determined through additional evidentiary hearings, that he has been 
unconstitutionally deprived, through no fault of his own, of his right to appeal. Such 
circumstances would include: (1) the defendant asked his or her attorney to file an appeal 
but the attorney, after agreeing to file, failed to do so, see Johnson, 635 P.2d 36; (2) the 
defendant diligently but futilely attempted to appeal within the statutory time frame 
without fault on defendant's part, see id.; or (3) the court or the defendant's attorney failed 
to properly advise defendant of the right to appeal. 
Clearly, the Petitioner in this case has established that any deadline that was missed was 
because of the ineffective assistance of counsel; Petitioner's untimely filing of the Rule 59 and 
60 motions was not because of any fault attributed to him. Based upon the principles found 
herein and on Manning, Michael is entitled to have this Court consider the Petitioner's Rule 
60(b)(1) Motion. 
6. Michael is Entitled to Relief because Brass Provided Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel and/or because Brass was Grossly Negligent2 
In this matter, Michael is not arguing that Brass' conduct constitutes "excusable neglect" 
but that "he willfully failed to comply with his most basic obligations" as articulated in the ABA 
Guidelines and adopted by this Court. Id. Michael's allegations are that Brass' actions are 
"inexcusable" and create "an extraordinary situation which cannot fairly or logically be classified 
as mere 'neglect.'" Thus if this Court finds that Michael is not entitled to relief pursuant to 
60(b)(1) because of his reasonable reliance on Brass, Michael is entitled to relief pursuant to 
60(b)(6) because Brass provided both ineffective assistance of counsel and because his actions 
were grossly negligent. Memies, 150 P. 2d 515: "both grounds constitute exceptional 
circumstances that warrant relief under 60(b)(6)." 
2 It is important to note, that tlie Appellant is arguing both theories—that Brass was grossly negligent and also 
provided ineffective assistance of counsel. The same evidence and argument support both theories of relief. The 
Appellant will not argue in depth both positions but adopts tlie arguments made herein under both theories. It is 
important however, to note that tlie Appellant is of the opinion that tlie detennination of the whetlier or not Brass 
was grossly negligent does not require tlie more stringent analysis of Strickland In other words, it is possible for 
this Court to detennine that tlie Appellant has not met tlie Strickland test but has met tlie grossly negligent test. 
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In Menzies, the Court found that Menzie, a death-row inmate in post-conviction relief 
action, has a statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel. The Court then addressed the 
issue of whether Menzies' counsel had demonstrated that Brass' performance was ineffective or 
grossly negligent. It is important to note that Menzies' counsel, Brass, is the same Brass who 
filed the Second Amended Petition in this case and represented the Appellant in the evidentiary 
hearing regarding the Second Amended Petition. 
The analytical framework for assessing ineffective assistance of counsel was developed 
by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), wherein the Court established a two-step inquiry. A finding of 
ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing that counsel performed below the standard 
of a reasonably effective attorney, and second, that counsel's errors prejudiced the Defendant 
from receiving a fair trial and/or sentence. As to the first prong, the Court found that ""[t]he 
benchmark forjudging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so 
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the [proceeding] cannot be 
relied on as having produced a just result." Menzie, 150 P. 3d at 511 quoting, Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 686. As to the second prong, the Court found that "if a litigant is constructively denied 
the assistance of counsel in a proceeding in which he or she is entitled to counsel, the adversary 
process itself is rendered inherently unreliable, and prejudice is presumed." Menzies, 150 P.3d at 
514. 
In the federal context, the right to the effective assistance of counsel is premised on a 
defendant's right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Strickland, 480 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. As the United States Supreme Court has noted, this 
right is designed to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair and reliable proceeding before 
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life or liberty are taken. Id at 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 
482, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (noting that "the right to the effective assistance of 
counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the 
accused to receive a fair [proceeding]" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). This 
fairness is "derive[d] from the adversarial nature of our justice system, which is premised on the 
'well-tested principle that truth - as well as fairness - is best discovered by powerful statements 
on both sides of the question.5" United States v. Collins, 430 F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir.2005) 
(quotingPenson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988)); see also 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (recognizing "the law's presumption that counsel will 
fulfill the role in the adversary process that the [Sixth] Amendment envisions"). 
The Court's inquiry regarding whether Brass' performance fell "below the standard" and 
whether Michael was prejudiced must be analyzed as it applies to the post-conviction relief. 
After a conviction and an unsuccessful appeal, the convicted person 
may file an action in the district court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to 
vacate or modify the conviction or sentence upon ... ineffective assistance of counsel in 
violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution or based upon .. .newly 
discovered material. 
Utah Code Section 78-35a-104 (1996) or, as modified, Utah Code Section 78B-9-104 (1) (2008). 
The Post Conviction Remedies Act also states that, in order for the Court to grant relief 
from a conviction or sentence, the Appellant must establish "that there would be a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome in light of the facts provided in the post-conviction 
proceedings, viewed with the evidence and facts introduced at trial or during sentencing." Utah 
Code Annotated §78B-9-104(2). But see prior statute, Utah Code Section 78-35a-104 
(i)(iv)(1996): "no reasonable trier of fact could have found the Petitioner guilty of the offense or 
subject to the sentence received." 
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Furthermore, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) states, in part, that a petition for post 
conviction relief "shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has in relation to the legality of the 
conviction or sentence Additional claims relating to the legality of the conviction or sentence 
may not be raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown " In other words, 
petitioner is required to bring all claims and any claims not raised become barred absent showing 
of good cause Accordingly, it is necessary that counsel for the Appellant, in the petition for post 
conviction relief, include all claims that would attack the legality of the Appellant's conviction 
and/or sentence As this Motion established, Brass failed to present evidence in support of 
Michael's claims and failed to raise all claims 
Brass' performance fell below the standard and amounted to gross negligence ABA 
Death Penalty Guideline 10 15 1 specifically details the duties of post-conviction counsel This 
guideline imposes on post-conviction counsel the duty to "fully discharge the ongoing 
obligations imposed by these guidelines " Addendum, Exhibit "13," ABA Death Penalty 
Guideline 10 15 1(E) (2003) One of these obligations is the duty to "maintain close contact with 
the client regarding litigation developments " Id Guideline 10 15 1(E)(1) This duty is discussed 
in depth in guideline 10 5, which states that counsel "should maintain close contact with the 
client," guideline 10 5(A) (2003), including discussing with the client "the progress of and 
prospects for the factual investigation, and what assistance the client might provide " Guideline 
10 5(C)(1) Counsel should also keep the client informed of "litigation developments," guideline 
10 15 1(E)(1), including "litigation deadlines and the projected schedule of case-related events," 
guideline 10 5(C)(6) The commentary to guideline 10 5 makes clear that counsel is obligated 
"at every stage of the case to keep the client informed of developments and progress in the case" 
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and that athe failure to maintain such a relationship is professionally irresponsible." Guideline 
10.5 cmt. 
In addition to the duty to communicate, guideline 10.15.1 also imposes on counsel the 
duty "to continue an aggressive investigation of all aspects of the case." Guideline 
10.15.1(E)(4). Likewise, guideline 10.7 provides that "[c]ounsel at every stage have an 
obligation to conduct thorough and independent investigations relating to the issues of both guilt 
and penalty." Guideline 10.7(A). As the commentary to guideline 10.7 notes, counsel has a 
"duty to take seriously the possibility of the client's innocence, to scrutinize carefully the quality 
of the state's case, and to investigate and re-investigate all possible defenses." Guideline 10.7 
cmt. The duty to investigate extends to the penalty phase, and counsel has a "duty to investigate 
and present mitigating evidence." Guideline 10.7 cmt.; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 
362, 395-96, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (holding that counsel was ineffective for 
failing to uncover and present mitigating evidence). 
These parallel tracks of investigation also apply in post-conviction proceedings, where 
post-conviction counsel has a duty to investigate, pursue and present "the facts underlying the 
conviction and sentence, as well as such items as trial counsel's performance." ABA Death 
Penalty Guideline 10.15.1 cmt. Counsel also has a duty to investigate the entire case in order "to 
discover mitigation that was not presented previously [and] also to identify mental health 
claims." Guideline 10.15.1 cmt. 
Finally, guideline 10.15.1 provides that "post-conviction counsel should seek to litigate 
all issues, whether or not previously presented, that are arguably meritorious under the standards 
applicable to high quality capital defense representation." In addition, guideline 10.8 provides 
that "Counsel at every stage of the case, exercising professional judgment," must "consider all 
31 
legal claims potentially available" and "thoroughly investigate the basis for each potential claim 
before reaching a conclusion as to whether it should be asserted." Guideline 10.8(A)(l)-(2). 
As the Court is aware, much of the legal standard outlined above is derived directly from 
the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Menzies v. Galetka, 150 P.3d 480 (Utah 2006). In 
reviewing the procedural and substantive posture of this case, the undersigned took notice of the 
Utah Supreme Court's findings that Brass, the attorney in question in this case, was less than 
effective and grossly negligent in his representation of Menzies in his post-conviction relief 
petition. In fact, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "Brass' representation in [that] case was 
deplorable," id. at 495, and that his "actions were inexplicable failures...." In addition to the 
Court's findings, Brass himself filed an affidavit that states that "I do not understand the complex 
procedural rules governing capital cases in state and federal post-conviction...." Addendum, 
Affidavit of Edward K. Brass as Exhibit "16 " 
Accordingly, the undersigned viewed the work done for Michael's post conviction relief 
with great skepticism. Obviously, in order to comply with the ABA Guidelines noted above the 
undersigned could not, in good conscience, solely rely on the research done by prior appointed 
counsel, nor pursue the same path and reargue the points which were obviously unpersuasive to 
the District Court. In fact, the Utah Supreme Court's findings in Menzies, coupled with the ABA 
Guidelines, clearly requires Michael's attorney to read the entire trial and appellate record in 
Lance Wood's case; read the entire trial and appellate file in Michael's case; read the entire 
Millard County Prosecutor's file; read the media court file which included information regarding 
Chris Jorgensen; meet with Appellant constantly to keep him informed of the progress of the 
case and to seek his input and approval regarding strategy; search for, locate and interview 
various witnesses regarding meritorious claims, including Chris Jorgensen, Lance Wood, Gary 
32 
Hawkins, Torin Plum, David Homer, Jeff Homer, Les Mabery, explore the need for experts, such 
as blood spatter experts, and to consider and thoroughly investigate, pursue and present all 
meritorious claims pursuant to post conviction relief 
In the process of complying with the duties imposed by the ABA Guidelines, several 
omissions and/or errors were discovered which indicated that Brass' performance fell below the 
standard imposed upon counsel in capital punishment cases and/or post-conviction relief cases 
In fact, it was obvious that Brass failed to properly evaluate any aspect of Michael's trial 
counsel's representation, other than his presentation of mitigation testimony These omissions 
and errors are enumerated herein and demonstrate that Brass provided ineffective assistance of 
counsel and was grossly negligent by failing to comply with the ABA Guidelines and standards 
adopted in Menzies 
To assist in determining both prongs of determing ineffective assistance of counsel 
(performance was below standard and prejudiced the Appellant) and whether Brass' 
representation was grossly negligent, it is important to keep in mind the State's, and Michael's, 
theories of the case During the trial, the State's theory of the case was that this horrendous 
murder was perpetrated by both Michael and Lance Wood In essence, the State attempted to 
show Michael's involvement in the murder was contrary to his testimony with evidence of the 
following (1) Church's blood found on Michael's clothing, (2) testimonies of Michael, as well 
as Lance Wood, (3) statements by both Michael and Lance Wood given at various times during 
the investigation, (4) testimony of witnesses indicating that Michael and Wood were together on 
the night of Gordon Church's death, (5) testimony of witnesses who saw them after the murder, 
(6) testimony that Michael was the aggressor, and (6) the shocking nature of Gordon Church's 
death The State advanced the theory that Michael was the aggressor and the more dominate 
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personality between him and Lance Wood, i.e., Lance Wood was scared of Michael. 
As for the defense, Michael's theory and testimony was that Lance Wood was the 
aggressor and therefore more culpable for Church's murder than was Michael. Addendum, 
Summary of Michael's testimony as Exhibit "18." Michael's testimony established, if believed 
by the trier of fact, that he was at most an accomplice to the murder, which would make the 
imposition of a death sentence disproportional to the crime committed by Michael, as well as 
being disproportional to the sentence imposed in Lance Wood's case. This case contained a 
substantial amount of forensic evidence. However, the only forensic evidence submitted by the 
State indicating Michael's involvement was the blood found on Michael's clothing. On the other 
hand, the forensic evidence demonstrating Lance Wood's involvement was extensive. 
Addendum, State vs. Wood, 868 P. 2d 70 (1993), as Exhibit "17." At trial, Esplin presented no 
expert testimony nor presented any witnesses (other than Michael) to support Michael's theory 
or to contradict the State's theory. 
Michael wrote three different letters to the Trial Court which informed the Court that 
Brass was not providing effective assistance of counsel. See Addendum, February 9, 2005 letter, 
as Exhibit "43", March 1, 2005 letter as Exhibit "44" and October 6, 2005 letter as Exhibit "45." 
Michael expressed to the Court that Brass was not visiting with him (spent a total of half an hour 
in two visits), was not keeping him informed about his case (had not sent him any papers) and 
would not take his calls (Brass' secretary would just hang up when he called). Id. Michael asked 
the Court to send him a docket so that he could find out what had been done on his case and also 
asked the Court to call Brass and basically order him to keep Michael informed about his case. 
In fact, in the March 1 letter, Michael states that Menzie told him that Mr. Brunker had stated to 
the Menzie's trial court that he needed more time because he was filing a second motion to 
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compel discovery in Archuleta's case. Michael expressed frustration to the Court that he did not 
even know that there had been a first motion to compel. Michael was very worried that his 
Petition would be dismissed because of Brass' inaction for the reasons the Petition was dismissed 
by the trial court in the Memie case. 
In response to Michael's letters, Brass, on or about October 26, 2005, filed a Motion 
asking that he be allowed to withdraw as Michael's attorney. See Addendum, Motion for Leave 
to Withdraw, as Exhibit "46." In the Motion, Brass expressed frustration and mental strain from 
being exposed to the State's Motion for Sanctions. Brass' frustration and emotional strain was 
exacerbated because of Michael's letters complaining about his ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Brass claimed that Michael's October 26 letter placed him "in the potential position of being a 
witness to contravene the statements of the letter." Id. at para. 2. Brass also complained that he 
was in reality working pro bono and that he did not have the time, resources and emotional 
strength to adequately represent Michael. Id. at para. 3. In fact, Brass argued that Michael's 
"attack" on his office manager created a conflict of interest and was reason enough to justify his 
withdrawal. Id. at para. 5. Brass continued in support of his request to withdraw by stating that 
because of the emotional and financial strain caused by his representation of Michael, Michael 
"would be better served by the appointment of an attorney or attorneys with the time, resource, 
and staff to visit him as often as he wishes and to accept his collect calls when he desires." Id. at 
para. 6. Brass filed a second Motion to Withdraw on or about March 16, 2006. See Addendum, 
Motion for Leave to Withdraw, as Exhibit "47." In the second Motion, Brass reiterated the fact 
that Michael's letter created a conflict of interest in that he was placed in "an ethically intolerable 
position and one that prevents counsel from devoting foil attention to the issues." Id. at para. 6. 
In this case before this Court, Brass filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Permit 
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Withdrawal of Counsel and to Remand to the Trial Court for the Appointment of Substitute 
Counsel on Appeal ("Memorandum in Support"). Addendum, Memorandum in Support, as 
Exhibit 48. The following excerpts support the position that the Appellant is entitled to the relief 
that he seeks in his Motion to Set Aside and/or Motion for a New Trial. 
a. "Archuleta's lawyers asserted in response [to Respondent's Motion for Sanctions 
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. R. 11], inter alia, that the claims which were not actively 
pursued after summary judgment were left unaddressed due to lack of time and 
resources." (R. 2017, 2031: uThe realities of the case and the situation required that he 
attempt to prioritize the claims in terms of his focus." Id. at p. 5. 
b. uThe record of this case contains numerous potential claims of deficient performance by 
Brass. As is detailed in the pleadings filed in the trial court, Brass was not qualified to 
represent Archuleta without co-counsel because he did not understand the complexities of 
the law, as demonstrated by his affidavit to that effect filed in another capital post-
conviction case (R 2321, 2319-2345, 2652-59). For much of the litigation of the post-
conviction case in the trial court, Brass was acting alone as counsel for Archuleta (R. 
1969, 2349-50, 2380, 2418), and without sufficient time and funding (R 1973-74). 
Several of Archuleta's claims were not pursued by his attorneys for lack of time and 
resources (R 2017, 2031). Brass did not seek additional time or funding or file an 
affidavit under Utah R Civ. P. 56(f) to obtain additional time or discovery to oppose 
summary judgment." Id. at p. 12-13. 
c. "One of the most critical conflicts which should be explored by substitute counsel is 
whether Brass' performance on Archuleta's behalf was limited to Archuleta's detriment 
by Brass's apprehension that if he zealously represented Archuleta in keeping with ABA 
standards and other professional norms, the Attorney General's Office would consider his 
conduct sanctionable and file additional motions, which Brass would have to litigate, 
again at the expense of his private practice and personal finances and life." 
Brass' response not only demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel and gross 
negligence, but coupled with the State's Motions for Sanctions, Brass' financial burdens, and 
Michael's complaints, raised to the level of creating a conflict of interest. When counsel labors 
under a conflict of interest, prejudice pursuant to the Stickland test is presumed. Cuyler v. 
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 and 369 (1980). The Trial Court, only addressing the argument that 
the State's Rule 11 sanctions caused a "conflict of interest," found that the "Petitioner has not, 
therefore, shown that Brass was suffering from a conflict of interest while representing Petitioner 
. . . ." R. p. 4896, at p. 44. However, the Trial Court's finding completely ignores Brass' own 
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comments found in his Memorandum in Support of Motion to Permit Withdrawal of Counsel and 
to Remand to the Trial Court for the Appointment of Substitute Counsel on Appeal where Brass 
admitted a conflict of interest because of the financial burden Michael's case created and 
Michael's letters in criticizing Brass' efforts in pursuing the post-conviction petition. 
Addendum, Memorandum in Support, as Exhibit 48. The Trial Court also neglected to consider 
the fact that the evidentiary hearing regarding the mitigation issues occurred after the State's 
February 26, 2004 Motion for Sanctions. This Court should presume prejudice based upon 
Brass' admission that there was a conflict of interest. 
Brass' representation met the Strickland test of ineffective assistance of counsel or 
constituted gross negligence by failing to comply with the ABA Guidelines as follows: 
1) Brass failed to maintain contact with Michael; 
2) Brass failed to discuss strategy with Michael, i.e. failed to discuss or obtain approval to 
present evidence that Michael's childhood damaged him to the point that he cannot be 
fixed, and that Michael would inevitably kill; 
3) There is no evidence that counsel reviewed both Wood's and Michael's court files, failed 
to review the prosecutor's file in both cases, and failed to review or was even aware of 
the media file. 
4) Brass failed to investigate, pursue and present witnesses that claimed that David Homer 
had recanted his testimony; that David Homer had been "planted"; and that the State had 
failed to disclose reports of the interviews; 
5) Brass failed to investigate, pursue and present witnesses that indicated that Wood had 
confessed that he had acted alone in killing Gordon Church; 
6) Brass failed to investigate, pursue and present mental illness issues and a possible Atkins' 
claim; 
7) Brass failed to investigate, pursue and present evidence regarding Wood's psychological 
and personality make-up; 
8) Brass failed to investigate, pursue and present expert witness testimony; 
9) Brass lacked adequate funding and lacked co-counsel to adequate pursue Archuleta's 
claims; 
10) Brass was concerned about pursuing claims which might garnish the wrath of the State in 
a Motion for Sanctions; 
11) Brass failed to investigate, pursue and present the issues found herein. 
The Respondent, which the Trial Court adopted, argued that the Appellant failed to 
"prove" that he was entitled to Rule 60 relief in that he failed to establish that he was entitled to 
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post-conviction relief. The response to this argument is detailed in Section A2 above and will 
not be restated herein. However, the recent United States Supreme Court of Sears vs. Upton, 
decided June 29, 2010, 09-8854 (FEDSC), is insightful to the issues before this Court. In Sears, 
the Supreme Court was critical of the trial court's stringent analysis of the prejudice prong of the 
Strickland standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel: "And more to the point, 
that a theory might be reasonable, in the abstract, does not obviate the need to analyze whether 
counsel's failure to conduct an adequate mitigation investigation before arriving at this particular 
theory prejudiced Sears. The 'reasonableness' of counsel's theory was, at this stage in the 
inquiry, beside the point: Sears might be prejudiced by his counsel's failures, whether his 
haphazard choice was reasonable or not." The Sears Court also held that a court, to a certain 
extent, is obligated to "speculate" when determining whether or not the Defendant was 
prejudiced: "That same standard applies-and will necessarily require a court to 'speculate' as to 
the effect of the new evidence- regardless of how much or how little . . . . evidence was 
presented during the initial penalty phase." 
The Sears case cannot be distinguished from this case. Clearly, Brass failed to properly 
investigate and pursue the claims as identified herein that his criminal trial attorney was 
ineffective. As set forth herein, the undersigned seeks to set aside the Trial Court's order 
denying Michael's Second Amended Petition for post conviction relief, or allow him to open the 
Second Amended Petition so that Michael can address all his claims. For the reasons stated 
herein, this Court should conclude that 1) Michael justifiably relied upon Brass to pursue his 
post-conviction relief; 2) that Brass failed to provide effective assistance of counsel; or 3) was 
grossly negligent as provided herein. 
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B. Instances Of Claims Brass failed to Investigate, Pursue or Present Which Establishes 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsels 
1. Newly Discovered Evidence of Brady Violations Regarding Lance Wood's 
Confessions 
On or about April 21, 1989, Lance Wood contacted Chris Jorgensen of the Salt Lake 
Tribune newspaper and confessed his involvement in the murder of Gordon Church. Regarding 
this conversation, Lance Wood states as follows: 
1. While waiting for trial from the jail, I called Marcus Taylor, my court appointed attorney, 
and told him that he was fired and that I was going to take the blame for all the injuries 
inflicted upon Gordon Church. 
2. I was under the impression that all my phone calls were being recorded and/or listened in 
on because there was no mechanism for attorney/client calls. 
3. Shortly after this conversation with Marcus Taylor, about 10 or 15 minutes later, Captain 
Decker brought me out of my jail cell to meet with Sheriff Ed Phillips and with the 
Prosecutor, Warren Peterson. 
4. My Attorney was not present for this meeting. 
5. As far as I know, I nor anybody else obtained permission from Marcus Taylor to speak 
with me. 
6. Somehow, they were aware that I had fired my attorney. 
7. At the meeting, Sheriff Phillips and Warren Peterson indicated that they had heard that I 
was taking the entire blame for the murder and that I was taking the position that Mr. 
Archuleta had not been involved. 
8. I told them that was accurate. 
9. Mr. Peterson and Sheriff Phillips then proceeded to influence me from admitting that I 
had inflicted all of the injuries on Mr. Church. 
10. We met for about 30 minutes and during this time, they were adamant that I should not 
take the blame for what happened. 
11. They were persistent in convincing me not to take the blame and only let me leave after I 
agreed not to take the position that Michael had not inflicted any of the injuries. 
12. They told me that they knew that Michael was involved and that it would not be right to 
let him walk free. 
13. Mr. Peterson and Sheriff Phillips convinced me not to take the blame. 
14.1 was surprised, based upon this conversation that the State continued to seek the death 
penalty against me. 
3 In Section A2 of this Brief, tlie Appellant argues that tlie Trial Court applied tlie wrong standard when addressing 
whether or not Michael is entitled to his Rule 60 (b) Motion. The Appellant will not set fortli this same argument as 
it applies to each specific claim—but by this reference will incorporate tlie Appellant's argument the Trial Court 
implemented tlie wrong standard as it applies to each specific claim. Furthermore, in Section A4 of this Brief tlie 
Appellant addressed tlie Trial Court's ruling regarding the Appellant's Rule 59 Motion and tlie additional evidence 
presented in Michael Archuleta's and Ed Brass* Affidavits as to each specific claim. The Appellant will not set 
fortli tlie same argument here regarding each specific claim—but by this reference will incorporate the Appellant's 
Rule 59 argument as it applies to each specific claim. 
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15. After this meeting, I then told my girlfriend, Brenda Stapley, to get a hold of a news 
reporter and to tell him that I wanted to talk to him. 
16.1 told Brenda to tell him that I had something to say that would be worth his time 
17. Later, Brenda gave me Mr. Jorgenson's telephone number and I called him from the jail. 
18.1 represented to Mr. Jorgenson that I wanted to plead guilty to inflicting all of the injuries 
to Mr. Gordon Church and that Michael did not participate in the murder. 
19.1 do not recall whether or not I provided details to Mr. Jorgenson regarding the specific 
acts inflicted upon Mr. Church or whether or not I simply indicated generally that I 
wanted to plead guilty to inflicting all the injuries to Mr. Church. 
20. Mr. Jorgenson may have asked me specifically about each injury, including the rectal 
injury, and that I acknowledged affirmatively that I wanted to plead guilty to each injury. 
21. None of Mike Michael's attorneys have ever contacted me to discuss any details about 
this case. 
Addendum as Exhibit "19." 
After the conversation with Lance Wood wherein he confessed his involvement in the 
murder of Gordon Church, Mr. Jorgenson called Warren Peterson, the Millard County 
Prosecutor, to advise him of Wood's confession. Warren Peterson responded to Jorgenson by 
stating that Wood's statements were false. Id. September 14, 1989 Ruling as Exhibit "20." 
On or about June 8, 1989, the State of Utah sent a subpoena to Chris Jorgensen, which he 
moved to quash. Id. as Exhibit "21." In response to Mr Jorgenson's motion to quash the 
subpoena, on September 26, 1989, Judge Ballif denied the Motion and ordered Mr. Jorgenson to 
surrender the tape and any transcription of the conversation to the prosecutor's office and to 
submit to a deposition on October 10, 1989 Id. September 14 Order, as Exhibit "20." 
There is no dispute that Mike Esplin, Michael's trial attorney, was present at all hearings 
before the Court regarding the State's efforts to obtain Mr. Jorgensen's taped conversation with 
Lance Wood and the efforts to quash the subpoena. However, Esplin may have missed the 
significance of the confession because Warren Peterson represented to the Court that Wood's 
confession to Jorgensen was that he was holding Gordon Church while Michael killed him. 
Obviously, this testimony would not be beneficial to Michael's case or defense. Furthermore, it 
should be remembered that Esplin was preparing for a trial that was just weeks away. 
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On or about October 9, 1989, just 42 days before Michael's trial, Mr. Holman, the 
attorney for Chris Jorgensen, filed with the court a Settlement Stipulation Regarding the 
Subpoena for Deposition of Chris Jorgensen between Mr. Jorgensen and the prosecutor's office. 
Id., letter dated October 9, 1989 as Exhibit "22." This Court should note that there was a carbon 
copy of the letter sent to Warren H. Peterson. Id. However, there is no indication or proof of 
service that either Mike Esplin or Marcus Taylor (counsel for Michael and Wood respectively) 
were sent a copy of the Settlement Agreement. 
The Settlement Agreement in pertinent part provides as follows: 
"Chris Jorgensen will provide to prosecutors for the State of Utah a transcription of the 
conversation conducted on or about the afternoon of April 21, 1989 between Chris 
Jorgensen and an individual believed to be Lance Conway Wood and a tape recording of 
that conversation." 
"Jorgensen also agrees to submit to an interview by prosecutors for the State of Utah . . . 
on October 11, 1989." 
"The State of Utah shall not disclose the contents of the transcript or tape-recording of 
the conversation between Mr. Jorgensen and Lance Conway Wood to any person or 
entity except, where necessary, to the court and to counsel for the alleged perpetrators of 
the homicide of Gordon Ray Church, nor shall the statements by the attorneys for the 
State of Utah to counsel for Chris Jorgensen and the Kearns-Tribune Corporation 
provided for in Paragraph 8 of this stipulation be disclosed except, where necessary, to 
the Court." 
Addendum, Settlement Agreement as Exhibit "23." 
Lance Wood's confession is relevant to Michael's Rule 60(b) Motion in that Brass failed 
to investigate and pursue this claim. It is relevant to this post-conyiction relief because it 
demonstrates that the State failed to disclose to Michael the following: (1) that Sherriff Phillips 
and Captain Decker met with Lance Wood and failed to provide a report of same to Michael; (2) 
neither counsel for Lance Wood nor Michael Archuleta was a party to this agreement; (3) the 
State failed to disclose to Michael what was discussed in the October 11 meeting the State had 
with Jorgensen, (4) the State failed to provide a tape recording of Wood's confession and failed 
to disclose a transcription of the conversation; (5) the State did not provide any tape recordings 
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of Lance Wood's phone call made from the jail to Marcus Taylor wherein he indicated his desire 
to confess to the murder of Gordon Church. See, Addendum, Motion for Discovery and 
Supplemental Response to Motion for Discovery State's Response to the Discovery Request, as 
Exhibits "24" and "25." 
It is important to note that the undersigned has reviewed every box and file in the 
prosecutor's office regarding both Lance Wood's and Michael's case and has not been able to 
locate either the tape recording or the transcript of the conversation. Addendum, Affidavit of 
James K. Slavens as Exhibit "26." It is also interesting to note that the State did not use Lance 
Wood's confession as impeachment in his own trial. Id. If Lance Wood had confessed that he 
held Gordon Church while Michael killed him, as Warren Peterson represented to the Court he 
said, the State would certainly have used that statement to impeach Lance Wood's claim of 
innocence. The fact that the state failed to impeach Lance Wood with this alleged statement 
supports what Lance now states, via his affidavit, that Lance did not confess as Warren Peterson 
represented; instead Wood confessed to Jorgensen, as Wood testifies, that Michael did not cause 
any injuries related to Church's death. 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L Ed.2d 215 (1963), and its progeny, 
makes clear that prosecutors have a continuing constitutional duty to disclose all material 
evidence that is favorable to a defendant. Clearly, the State violated this duty by failing to 
disclose the above evidence to Michael. Because of that violation, Michael is entitled to a new 
trial, or alternatively, to a reduced sentence of life imprisonment. See also, Tillman v. State, 128 
P.3d 1123 (2005). 
InStricklerv. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999), the United 
States Supreme Court identified the three components necessary to establish a Brady 
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prosecutorial misconduct claim (1) the evidence at issue is "favorable to the accused, either 
because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching", (2) the evidence was "suppressed by the 
State, either willfully or inadvertently", and (3) prejudice ensued Id. at 281-82, 119 S Ct 1936 
Clearly, applying the Brady test, Wood's confession is favorable to Michael's defense 
because it supports Michael's theory of the case-which he held from the beginning of the 
investigation—that he did not participate in the murder but that Wood committed the murder 
This evidence is "favorable to the accused" in both the guilt phase and the penalty phase 
Clearly, Sheriff Phillip's meeting with Lance Wood should have been disclosed to Michael's 
attorney Also, Lance Wood's conservation with Mr Jorgensen should have been disclosed to 
Michael and his attorney The State's interview with Mr Jorgensen should also have been 
disclosed to Michael This is true even if the State believed that Mr Wood was being deceptive 
in his representations The State is obligated to disclose any and all evidence which supports 
Michael's theory of the case, and then, Michael's attorney can determine how and whether to use 
the evidence in support of his defense This case is replete with instances where evidence was 
obtained by the State, but discarded, simply because the evidence did not "fit" the State's theory 
of the case 
Alternatively, even if the facts of this case do not establish a, Brady violation, Esplin 
failed, if he knew, to investigate, pursue and present the matter and amounted to ineffective 
assistance of counsel or gross negligence Brass was ineffective and committed gross negligence 
during the post-conviction relief action by not fully investigating the files and discovering 
Wood's confession and bringing it before the Court Brass was also ineffective and grossly 
negligent for failing to interview Lance Wood and presents his affidavit as evidence 
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As the above demonstrates, Brass' performance fell "below standard" and prejudice is 
presumed because of Brass' conflict of interest. Furthermore, prejudice is established because 
Lance Wood's confession would have collaborated Michael's trial strategy. The Appellant has 
submitted other witness statements where Wood also confessed to them. Brass failed to fully 
explore and present the alleged Brady violation, or in the alternative, explore Esplin's ineffective 
assistance of counsel regarding Wood's confessions. Even though Michael had informed Brass 
that Wood had confessed to several individuals, Brass made no effort to interview Wood to 
determine his testimony. For this reason, the Trial Court should have granted Michael's Rule 59 
and Rule 60 Motions. 
The Trial Court denied Michael's claim in part by finding that "Petitioner has not 
demonstrated that Brass should have known in 2002 what Wood in 2009 attested were the facts 
prior to Petitioner's trial concerning Wood's desire to 'plead guilty' to inflicting all of the 
injuries on Church." R. p. 4896, p. 48. This statement from the Trial Court points out the 
fundamental error of the Trial Court's reasoning. First, the Appellant's claim asserts a, Brady 
violation in that the State never disclosed the information to Esplin, Michael's criminal trial 
counsel. Michael told Brass that he wanted Brass to pursue the claim in his petition for post 
conviction relief that Wood had made various confessions that Wood had perpetrated the murder. 
Addendum, Exhibit "29." Brass never pursued or investigated the claim, which is the reason that 
we have Wood's statement in 2009 instead of 2002. The fact that the statement in affidavit form 
was finally obtained in 2009 is not justification that Brass acted effectively but instead is just the 
opposite—proves he was ineffective. 
The Trial Court also emphasized, to support its conclusion, a finding that "Petitioner 
himself had previously stated to his fiancee, Paula Jones, that he and Petitioner were equally 
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responsible for Church's death." R. 4896, p. 49, 50, 56 and 58. The Trial Court fails to cite from 
the record where Michael allegedly made that statement. There is support for the proposition 
that Paula Jones had testified that Michael had told her that "they" had killed Church. However, 
it is a huge leap in logic to take from Paula's testimony, who was not present at the time of the 
attack, that Michael may have used the word "they" in describing the death to the position that 
Michael admitted that he was "equally responsible" for Gordon's death. 
Regarding this claim, the Appellant has met his burden in demonstrating that he is 
entitled to his Rule 60 Motion to Set Aside Judge Eyre's ruling granting the State its Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
2. Issues Re2arding David Homer 
In support of its position that the death penalty was an appropriate sentence for Michael's 
conviction, the State presented testimonial evidence from David Homer ("Homer"). Homer was 
a State inmate that knew Michael while they were both incarcerated in Iron County. However 
David Homer happened to be incarcerated in the Millard County jail at the time Michael was 
arrested for the murder of Gordon Church. 
Homer testified in the penalty phase that Michael had told him that killing Gordon was 
the "ultimate rush." Addendum, Exhibit "38," Criminal Trial Transcript, p. 3574 1.15-20. 
Michael indicated to all his attorneys that Homer had recanted his testimony and had indicated to 
them that the Sheriffs department "planted" Homer and made certain promises to him in 
exchange for his testimony and cooperation. Addendum, Exhibit "29," Affidavit of Michael 
Archuleta. One such person to whom Homer has stated that his testimony was false is Leslie 
Mabrey, who knew both Michael and Homer. 
Les Mabrey's relevant testimony is as follows: 
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a While performing my janitorial duties, I often overheard the conversations of 
other inmates and law enforcers or jail personnel at locations inside and outside 
the jail See Addendum, Affidavit of Les Mabrey as Exhibit "27 " 
b Fellow inmate David Homer was known in the Millard County Jail as an 
informant or a snitch 
c On one occasion I overheard a conversation between Homer and Sheriffs Officer 
Robert Dekker while Homer was washing Dekker's police care Dekker told 
Homer he would "look out" for Homer when Homer went before the parole board 
provided that Homer could get some dirt on Archuleta Homer agreed, stating 
that he would have to be moved into Archuleta's section to accomplish the task 
Homer was moved to Archuleta's section of Millard County Jail soon thereafter 
d After Homer was moved to Archuleta's section, Homer told me he was gathering 
data against Archuleta, and stated, "I've got a real good little thing going here " 
He said he intended to use his testimony against Archuleta "to manipulate my 
way out of here" 
e Homer bragged that it was his testimony that had gotten Archuleta the death 
penalty Homer boasted about the expression on the judge's face when Homer 
told the jury that Archuleta had claimed that killing Church had been the 
"ultimate rush " 
f After Homer had told me about fabricating his testimony, I tried to contact 
Archuleta's defense attorney, Mike Esplin, several times, but Esplin did not 
respond 
g Wood responded that he was not a rat but had merely done what he could to get 
the best deal Wood went on to claim that it was he who struck the "fucking 
homo" and then rammed a tire iron "up his ass just like he liked it " Wood went 
on to say he did not know why he had killed Church but that sometimes you just 
get crazy and do things by instinct 
h I personally reported what Wood had said to Dekker However, Dekker told me 
that his hands were tied because Wood had led authorities to Church's body, 
although Dekker admitted Wood had only been trying to save his own skin 
Additionally, Jeff Homer's affidavit corroborates Les Mabrey's statement that Homer 
confessed that he lied during his testimony 
a I am the brother of David Homer, who testified at Michael Archuleta's trial 
David Homer testified that while he and Archuleta were housed at the Millard 
County Jail prior to Archuleta's trial, Archuleta spoke to him about the murder of 
Gordon Church David Homer testified that Archuleta told him that killing 
Church was "the ultimate rush " 
b After my brother and I were released from unrelated prison terms, we met at our 
mother's house and took a drive into the canyons During this outing, my brother 
told me that Archuleta had not made the statements that David Homer had 
attributed to him at trial My brother told me that his testimony was a complete 
fabrication He told me that he testified that Archuleta liked killing Church, but 
that Archuleta never told him that 
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c. Millard County Sheriffs officers intentionally put my brother into the section of 
the jail with Archuleta to gather information. The law enforcement officials 
wanted my brother to establish premeditation so Archuleta would get the death 
penalty. It is my understanding that they had decided in advance what they 
wanted my brother to say. My brother told me he was placed in there for a 
specific purpose, to gather information. 
d. My brother became close to Millard County Sheriffs officials and was afforded 
many privileges. My brother, who was a trustee, was taken to church and school 
functions and gave motivational speeches at the behest of the sheriff to groups of 
teenagers. The speeches were designed to warn teens away from a life of crime. 
My brother was invited to Sheriff Ed Phillips' home and ate dinner with the 
sheriffs family during his incarceration in Millard County. 
e. Millard County law enforcers were intent on convicting Archuleta and sentencing 
him to death because the victim came from a very prominent family. Sheriffs 
officials and prosecutors were close to the victim's family. 
f. My brother told me that an officer named Dekker told him, "I want that 
cocksucker (Archuleta) on Death Row." Further, my brother told me that Decker 
had stated that he "wanted to shoot him (Archuleta) myself" 
g. My brother, David Homer, believed his cooperation with law enforcers might 
help him get out of prison sooner. My brother never expressed any regret for 
having falsely testified against Archuleta. My brother disliked Archuleta because 
he believed Archuleta was a homosexual. My borhter told me he believed 
Archuleta "got what he deserved." 
Addendum, Declaration of Jeff Homer, as Exhibit "28." 
The evidence referenced above was discovered after Michael's conviction and sentence 
to death which, if true, is very relevant on several levels. First, David Homer's testimony that 
Michael told him that killing Church was the "ultimate high" may have been the very testimony 
that distinguished Wood, who received a life sentence, from Michael who received the death 
penalty. This newly discovered testimony in and of itself justifies setting the sentence aside. 
Second, the State "planted" David Homer in Michael's cell for the purpose of interrogating him 
without the aid of counsel. This act violated Michael's right to a Miranda warning and justifies 
suppressing David Homer's testimony. Third, Mabrey's and Jeffrey Homer's testimonies, as . 
well as the testimony of others, supports Michael's defense that Wood committed the murder. 
Fourth, the State's failure to disclose the meetings with David Homer to Michael amount to a 
Brady violation. 
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As this Court is well aware, the government may not deliberately elicit incriminating 
statements from a defendant after he has invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Maine 
v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 65 L. 
Ed. 2d 115. In United States v. Henry, a defendant awaiting trial made incriminating statements 
to a fellow inmate, who was acting as a paid government informant, and who testified against the 
defendant at trial. Id. The Court held that the informant's statements were inadmissible because 
the government violated the Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel "[b]y intentionally 
creating a situation likely to induce Henry to make incriminating statements without the 
assistance of counsel;' Id. at 274, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 125. 
Similarly, in Maine v. Moulton, the defendant made incriminating post-indictment 
statements to a co-defendant who, unbeknownst to Defendant, had made a deal with the State to 
testify against the defendant and was wearing a recorder during a meeting with the Defendant. 
474 U.S. 159, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481. The Court held that the government violated the Defendant's 
Sixth Amendment rights by violating its "affirmative obligation not to act in a manner that 
circumvents and thereby dilutes the protection afforded by counsel." Id. at 171, 88 L. Ed. at 493. 
The primary concern of this line of decisions is "secret interrogation by investigatory techniques 
that are the equivalent of direct police interrogation." Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 411 U.S. 436, 459, 
91 L. Ed. 2d 364, 384 (1986). 
Thus, if the State did in fact "plant" David Homer to obtain information from Michael, 
the State violated his Sixth Amendment right because the State obtained incriminating statements 
from Michael after the right to counsel had attached. If that is the case, David Homer's very 
crucial testimony should have been suppressed, entitling Michael to post conviction relief 
Furthermore, as indicated above, Lance Wood made the same confession at least to Mr 
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Jorgensen, Gary Hawkins and Leslie Mabrey, that he acted alone in killing Church. This 
evidence is crucial because Wood's confession supports Michael's trial position that Wood 
inflicted all of the injuries causing the death of Gordon Church. This testimony amounts to new 
evidence supporting Michael's account of what happened at Dog Valley. 
Finally, if the testimony is true, Mr. Mabrey5 s and Jeffrey Homer's testimonies establish 
a Brady violation. Caption Dekker should have prepared a report regarding his encounters with 
David Homer, and the State should have disclosed the information to the Appellant. See Legal 
Analysis regarding Brady violations found in previous Section. 
Applying the facts of this case to the law above, it is clear that Brass should have taken 
steps to do the following: (1) subpoena Mr Homer's parole documents to determine if Millard 
County provided a "favorable" word for him; (2) subpoena the Millard County Jail records to 
determine where the inmates were housed to determine if the inmate transfers supported Mr. 
Mabrey's statement; (3) take the depositions of and produce David Homer, Les Mabrey, Jeff 
Homer and Torin Plum as witnesses during the evidentiary hearing; (4) pursue a Brady violation 
for the State not providing a report regarding Captain Dekker's contact with Mr. Homer and his 
contact with Mr. Mabrey. See Exhibit "13," ABA Guidelines 10.15.1(E)(4) & 10.7. 
It should be noted that Michael raised this allegation, in Issue Number 12 (d) of both the 
First and Second Amended Petitions for Post Conviction Relief. The Trial Court granted 
summary judgment as to this issue finding that it was procedurally barred and should have been 
raised during Michael's direct appeal. However, it appears that the Court's summary judgment 
order as to David Homer's testimony was an oversight. Issue 12 (d) alleges that subsequent to 
David Homer's testimony and conviction of Michael and the direct appeal in this matter, 
witnesses have come forward and indicated that David Homer has admitted that he committed 
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perjury. This Court should overturn the Trial Court's Summary Judgment ruling as to this issue. 
At least, Brass should not have allowed the claim to be lost by default. 
Michael, on numerous occasions, informed his previous attorneys that several witnesses 
had told him that David Homer had recanted his testimony, and Michael requested that the 
attorneys find these people to verify their statements. Addendum, Affidavit of Michael 
Archuleta as Exhibit "29." The fact that Mr. Brass did not explore this issue during the post 
conviction relief was ineffective assistance of counsel or amounted to gross negligence. As such, 
Michael should be allowed to open up this matter to explore this claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel pursuant to Rule 60 and Rule 59. 
The Trial Court rejected, in part, the Appellant's Rule 60 (b) Motion as to this issue by 
finding as follows: 
However, in the Court's view, the mere absence of Homer's testimony, when considered in 
the context of all the aggravating evidence demonstrating (1) that Petitioner was at least as 
responsible for the murder of Church as was his co-defendant Wood, and (2) the utter 
brutality and callousness of the murder, would not have resulted in a single juror altering his 
or her sentencing decision in favor of death. 
R. p. 4896 at 54. 
First, as argued herein, because of Brass' conflict of interest, this Court should simply 
presume prejudice. Second, the Trial Court's reasoning is in error because we actually have a 
jury that was presented the same "aggravating evidence" that Wood and Archuleta were co-
conspirators and evidence of the "utter brutality and callousness of the murder" that found for a 
life sentence instead of the death sentence. It appears that the single difference between what 
was considered by the Wood jury and the Archuleta jury was Homer's testimony. The position 
that "a single juror" would not have altered his/her verdict cannot be supported because we have 
a jury that did just that. 
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Finally, the Trial Court found that even if Michael's statements violated the protection of 
Miranda, "they are admissible to impeach conflicting testimony by the defendant" Id at 54 
However, this position is contrary to the law. The Trial Court relied upon Michigan v. Harvey, 
494 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1990) and State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1190 (1995), to support the 
proposition that any statement Michael made to David Homer could have been used for 
impeachment purposes. However, the cases cited by the Trial Court do not support this 
proposition. Instead, these cases stand for the proposition that voluntary statements a Defendant 
makes to the police in the absence of an attorney that otherwise violates the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments are admissible for impeachment purposes This case is different in that the 
Miranda violation was to a jail-house snitch-not a police officer. Jail-house snitches are 
notoriously unreliable, where police officers are not Even if this is not an exception to Harvey 
and Troyer, the State has the burden of establishing that the trustworthiness of the evidence 
satisfies legal standards before the testimony can be submitted. As the Petitioner has clearly 
demonstrated herein, David Homer lacks any trustworthiness. Certainly, the Trial Court would 
need to conduct a "trustworthy" analysis before Homer's testimony could be admitted for 
impeachment purposes Without this determination, it would be inappropriate at this posture to 
declare it trustworthy. 
Again, in summary, Brass= performance or lack thereof is the only issue as to whether or 
not Appellant is entitled to relief pursuant to the Rule 60 and 59 motions. The Appellant is not 
required to prove Brady violations for the relief or that there is "newly discovered evidence" 
justifying post-conviction relief for Rule 59 and 60 As the above demonstrates, the Court 
should grant the Appellant his relief so that the Brady and/or newly-discovered claims can be 
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pursued, discovery conducted and then the Court allowed to determine the claim based upon its 
merits 
3 Failure to Contact Gary Hawkins Regarding the Confession of Lance Wood 
As stated herein, Michael's defense in this matter was that Mr Wood inflicted all of the 
injuries causing the death of Gordon Church Michael, during the time he was represented by 
Brass, informed Brass that Lance Wood had confessed to Gary Hawkins, among others as 
indicated herein, that he had inflicted all of the injuries causing the death of Gordon Church 
Apparently, Michael's efforts fell on deaf ears 
Gary Hawkins, a former inmate at the Idaho State Prison and the Utah State Prison, has 
signed an affidavit testifying as to the following 
1 During, the last eighteen years I became acquainted with both Lance Wood and Michael 
while incarcerated in the Idaho State Prison and the Utah State Prison 
2 I first served time in the Idaho State Prison and became familiar with Lance Wood 
3 Lance Wood had the reputation in the prison as being a rat or a narc 
4 Lance Wood also had the reputation that he had deferred blame regarding his murder 
charge to his crime partner 
5 Most of the prison inmates would not associate with Lance Wood because of his 
reputation 
6 I did not care about the games that most of the inmates played and had no objection to 
associating with Lance Wood 
7 Lance Wood and I became acquainted, and I associated with him extensively 
8 Lance Wood never talked to me about the actual murder act during this period of time 
9 During or about June of 1991,1 was transferred to Utah State Prison 
10 There I met, associated with and became acquainted with Michael 
11 Michael had the reputation of being a follower 
12 1 never knew Michael to ever get in trouble with the prison officers or with other 
prisoners 
13 Michael never discussed with me anything about the murder act 
14 Michael's reputation, which was affirmed by my own observations, was that he was not 
very smart 
15 In or about January of 1996,1 was sent back to Idaho State Prison and became 
reacquainted with Lance Wood 
16 Based upon my observations and interactions with Lance Wood, there is no question in 
my mind that Lance is the more resourceful of the two 
17 Lance Wood bragged to me on numerous occasions about how he had outsmarted the 
police by reversing his actions with that of Mike Archuleta's actions 
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18. Lance Wood indicated to me that he was writing a book about the murder. 
19. Based upon my observations, Lance Wood was writing a book. 
20. Lance Wood indicated that in the book, his character reversed roles with the co-
defendant, which fooled the police. 
21. Lance Wood indicated to me that he had sent the book for publishing. 
22. Lance Wood indicated to me that he and his girlfriend had done acid just prior to the 
murder. 
23. Lance Wood on numerous occasions referred to Michael as being stupid. 
24. On one occasion, Lance Wood acted out the murder for me. 
25. Lance Wood demonstrated to me how he killed Gordon Church. 
26. During this re-creation, Lance Wood actually demonstrated how he repeatedly swung in a 
golf swing motion, a metal object at Gordon Church's head. 
27.1 have been in prison for over 18 years, and during that time, I have talked to all kinds of 
criminals, murderers, child molesters and etc. 
28.1 have never witnessed what I observed in Lance Wood's demeanor. 
29. As he was acting out the killing of Gordon Church, Lance Wood said things as if he were 
actually speaking to Gordon Church. 
30.1 cannot recall Lance Wood's exact words, but they were very hateful words directed 
towards Gordon Church being gay and getting what he deserved. 
31. Lance Wood also acted out how he shoved the tire iron up Gordon Church's anal cavity 
and made the comment, as if he were actually talking to Gordon Church, "got a little 
more than what you bargained for." 
32. Lance Wood's facial features could not be faked but instead had the appearance as if he 
had actually gone back in his mind to the time the murder was committed. 
33. Lance Wood's facial features displayed pure anger and hatred. 
34.1 do not recall Lance Wood ever actually said that Michael did not inflict any of the 
injuries, but instead Lance Wood simply described how he had done the killing. 
35. Lance Wood never described to me that Michael had inflicted any of the injuries on 
Gordon Church. 
36. Although Lance Wood only talked once about the actual murder, on numerous occasions, 
Lance consistently described several other aspects of his involvement. 
37. Lance Wood on numerous occasions bragged about how he had tricked the police into 
believing that Michael had performed the acts that he had actually performed. 
38. He has repeatedly stated how easy it was to trick the police. 
39.1 asked Lance Wood how he could live with someone else being executed for something 
that he did. 
40. Lance did not respond but sat down as if it affected him. 
41.1 have no reservations in testifying that of the two, Lance Wood was the leader and much 
more capable of switching the roles and that Mike Archuleta lacked the sophistication in 
fabricating such a story 
See Addendum, Affidavit of Gary Hawkins as Exhibit "30," 
If Gary Hawkins' testimony is found to be true, it constitutes new evidence that supports 
Michael's version of what happened at Dog Valley. Further, it supports Mr. Mabrey's and Mr. 
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Homer's testimonies that Wood had confessed to them that he inflicted all of the injuries. It also 
indicates that Mr. Wood's confession to Mr. Jorgensen not only occurred but was accurate. 
Finally, it is evidence that disputes the State's case that Michael was more aggressive and the 
leader between him and Wood. 
The fact that Mr. Brass did not fully explore this issue during Michael's post conviction 
relief petition constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. As such, Michael's Rule 59 and 60 
motions should be granted based upon Brass' ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The Trial Court denied Appellant's claim taking the same position as it did on other 
claims: 1) that Michael failed to present evidence that he told Brass about Gary Hawkins, R. p. 
4896 at p. 56; 2) that he told Paula Jones that he was equally responsible for Church's murder, 
id.; and 3) that because of the depravity of the murder, even with Mr. Hawkins' testimony a 
different result could not be expected, id. at 59 As to point one, Michael's Amended Affidavit 
makes it clear that he told Brass about Gary Hawkins. Addendum, Exhibit "29." As to points 
two and three, see the discussion in Section 3 above, beginning on page 51, regarding Paula 
Jones' testimony and whether or not a single juror would have found differently with the 
additional testimony. Furthermore, Gary Hawkins' testimony, if true, substantially supports 
Michael's trial and sentencing theories. Gary Hawkins' testimony constitutes new evidence that 
supports Michael's version of what happened at Dog Valley. Further, it supports Mr. Mabrey's 
and Mr. Homer's testimonies that Wood had confessed to them that he inflicted all of the 
injuries. It also indicates that Mr. Wood's confession to Mr. Jorgensen not only occurred but 
was accurate. Finally, it is evidence that disputes the State's case that Michael was the aggressor 
and the leader between him and Lance. Gary Hawkins' testimony solidifies the other testimony 
regarding Michael's theory of the case and supports its credibility. 
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The fact that Mr Brass allowed default as to this issue ancjl did not fully explore this 
claim during Michael's post conviction relief petition constitutes ineffective assistance of 
counsel and gross negligence As such, Michael's Rule 59 and 60 motions should be granted 
based upon Brass' failure to properly investigate and present thesp claims 
4. Mr. Brass' Failure to Explore Whether Michael is Exempt from the Death Penalty 
Pursuant to Atkins v, Virzina* 536 U.S. 304 
In support of the Second Amended Petition, Brass retained Dr Cunningham and Dr 
Gummow and solicited their testimony to support the position that Michael's criminal trial 
attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his presentation of mitigating 
circumstances Addendum, Affidavits of Dr Cunningham and Dr Gummow, as Exhibits "31" 
and "32 " The retained experts focused on mitigation evidence regarding whether at "the time of 
the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement of law was substantially impaired as a 
result of mental illness " Addendum, Utah Code Section 76-3-207 as Exhibit "33 " Trial 
Court rejected Brass' claim that Esplin was ineffective in presenting mitigation and held Dr 
Cunningham's and Dr Gummow's testimony, in summary, contradicted Michael's trial 
testimony that he did not participate in the murder In other words, Judge Eyre found that the 
expert's testimony not only failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, but that it would 
have been an ineffective strategy for Esplin to contradict Michaels's trial testimony by 
introducing, in mitigation, that Michael's past created a person which ultimately would kill 
regardless of intervention With that finding, the Trial Court could not grant Michael's post-
conviction request which faulted Esplin for not switching the strategy during the penalty phase to 
a position of explaining why Michael committed a murder which he maintains he did not 
commit For reasons stated herein, Brass' use and focus of these witnesses was misplaced and 
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amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel., 
Initially, Brass never consulted with Michael regarding implementation of a strategy 
explaining why he might have brutally murdered Gordon Church when it had been Michael's 
position that he did not participate in the murder, a position that he continues to maintain. 
Addendum, Affidavit of Michael Archuleta as Exhibit "29." More importantly, there is a 
separate basis for post conviction relief that Brass should have explored with the retained 
experts. Dr. Cunningham and Dr. Gummow emphasized repeatedly during their testimony that 
Michael has severe mental issues which upon proper exploration would have established the 
statutory definition of mental retardation, which gives rise to an Atkins claim. 
In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, the United States Supreme Court found that 
executing a mentally retarded person violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitutional protection against excessive punishments. The Supreme Court noted that multiple 
state legislatures had barred the practice of executing mentally retarded defendants. Atkins at 
313-317. The Court found that executing mentally retarded defendants did not measurably 
advance either of the two main justifications for imposition of a death sentence, i.e. retribution 
and deterrence. Atkins at 321; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976). 
The court in Atkins intentionally did not provide a specific I.Q. score cut-off point for 
mental retardation or even identify a particular way of making that determination. Atkins, 536 
U.S. at 317. The Atkins Court's view was that the best measure of intellectual functioning 
remains a matter of fact to be resolved on the trial court level, based on the evidence of each 
individual case. Id. 
"Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference between right and wrong and 
are competent to stand trial. Because of their impairments, however, by definition they 
have diminished capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to 
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abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to 
control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others. There is no evidence that they 
are more likely to engage in criminal conduct than others, but there is abundant evidence 
that they often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan." 
H a t 318. 
Whzn Atkins was decided, the United States Supreme Court left the states to implement 
the ruling as each saw fit. As would be expected, there are many different definitions of mental 
retardation employed by the various states which still employ the death penalty. Some states 
give specific IQ numbers which either presumptively rule in, or rule out, persons who might 
qualify as mentally retarded, while some states utilize the definitions provided by professional 
organizations working in the field of mental retardation. 
In response to the Supreme Court's holding in Atkins, the Utah State Legislature enacted 
section 77-15a-101, et. seq. in 2003 which allows a Utah defendant to seek exemption from the 
death penalty if that defendant meets the definition of mental retardation in this specific statutory 
context. The term "mentally retarded" is defined in section 77-15a-102 as a condition in which 
an individual has 
significant subaverage general intellectual functioning that results in and exists concurrently 
with significant deficiencies in adaptive functioning that exist primarily in the areas of 
reasoning or impulse control, or in both of these areas; and (2) the subaverage general 
intellectual functioning and the significant deficiencies in adaptive functioning under 
Subsection (1) are both manifested prior to age 22. 
In discussions regarding this legislation and the legislature's interpretation of Atkins on the 
Utah Senate floor, Senator Gladwell explained the issue with the following statement: u[w]hat 
Atkins said was not so much that the mentally retarded cannot form the intent to commit a 
heinous crime but that the mentally retarded are a group of unfortunate citizens who live among 
us, about 1-3% who taking everything in context of where they live, [their] inability to perceive 
life as we do. . . . [I]t just is simply cruel and unusual for us to execute them and the [C]ourt 
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actually said this is an excessive an excessive application of the 8n Amendment if we're 
allowing them to be executed " Utah State Legislature General Session, S B 8 (Feb 5, 
2003) (statement of Sen David Gladwell), see Tr Senate Debate at 22 
The process of determining whether or not a person is mentally retarded pursuant to 77-
15a-102, is clearly delineated in the statute Prior to beginning that factual analysis, it is 
appropriate to consider the standard of review established for this issue Utah Code Annotated 
section 77-15a-104(12)(a) states that "A defendant is presumed to be not mentally retarded 
unless the court, by a preponderance of the evidence, finds the defendant to be mentally retarded 
The burden of proof is upon the proponent of mental retardation at the hearing " Utah Code Ann 
§77-15a-104(12)(a) (2003) (emphasis added) 
A preponderance of the evidence is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as "that degree of 
proof which is more probable than not " Black's Law Dictionary 1182 (6th ed 1990) In other 
words, it is evidence which is more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition 
to it, it shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not Utah State Senator 
David Gladwell, in discussing the preponderance of evidence standard in the transcribed 
legislative history for this statute, described it as "the very lowest standard of proof, it's fifty 
percent plus a penny essentially " See Tr Sen Deb at 4 
Subsection (b) provides that a finding of mental retardation only operates to exempt the 
person from a death sentence and not for any other purpose or adjudication See Utah Code Ann 
§ 77-15a-104(12)(b) (2003) This subsection carries exceptional importance in the case at bar 
"Mental retardation" in this context is not the same as the classic clinical definition used to 
qualify a person, for example, seeking public benefits or services Rather, it is a more broadly 
defined concept designed to include persons who might not otherwise qualify based solely on a 
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numeric score. 
Dr. Cunningham and Dr. Gammo, experts retained in this matter, have both come to the 
conclusion that Michael does have significant adaptive functioning difficulties in the area of 
reasoning and impulse control. Michael clearly has diminished "capacity to understand and 
process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to 
engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others." The 
following are a few examples drawn from their testimony which demonstrate this fact: 
1. Michael's IQ, taking into account the Flynn effect, was 71 or 72, a score within mental 
retardation range. Addendum, May 17, 2006 Bench Trial Transcript, Vol. II, p. 211-212 as 
Exhibit "34." 
2. There is significant evidence in Michael's history to justify a concern about Michael's 
neuropsychological functioning. Id. at p. 229. 
3. A full neuropsychological assessment that included a full scale intellectual assessment to 
comprehensively assess the functional adequacy of Michael's brain function. Id. 231 and 58-
59. 
4. Michael's history clearly demonstrates that there is organic brain damage. Id. at 48. 
5. Michael's history indicated that he suffered mental retardation^ Id at 93-94. 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-15a-101 provides an exemption from the death penalty for 
those individuals who are charged with capital offenses but who have been determined by the 
trial court to be mentally retarded. This issue has not been properly addressed by the Court. 
Brass provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to explore, investigate and ultimately 
raise the issue of Atkins defense with the Court. The Atkins defense would not be contrary to 
Michael's testimony as to what happened at Dog Valley and woul4 not characterize Michael as a 
monster pre-disposed to murder. As such, Michael's Motion to Set Aside Judgment, pursuant to 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60(b), must be granted so that Michael's Atkins claim can 
be pursued. 
The Trial Court found that Appellant failed to present evidence that he could meet the 
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standard necessary for an Atkin 's defense. R. p. 4896 at 63. Again, the Appellant at this posture 
of the case is not required to establish that he is entitled to post-conviction relief, only that Brass 
was ineffective or grossly negligent in pursuing the claim. The fact of the matter is that Brass 
never retained an expert regarding the issue of whether or not Michael met the statutory 
definition of "mentally retarded" found in Utah Code Section 77-15a-102. This fact constitutes 
ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to Sears as discussed in Section A6 above. 
5. Failure to Produce Evidence Regarding Lance Wood's Personality and 
Psychological Assessments. 
Again, Michael's defense in this matter was that Lance Wood inflicted the injuries on 
Gordon Church. The State's case was that Michael was the aggressor and controlling person in 
this matter. The State presented evidence that Wood was scared of Michael and that Michael 
was the leader with Wood being the follower. Esplin should have retained an expert to compare 
Michael's and Lance's personality and psychological assessments. Such a comparison would 
have contradicted the State's evidence and supported Michael's theory of the case. Specifically, 
Esplin failed to produce evidence that: 
1) Michael's IQ taking into account the Flynn effect was 71 or 72, a score within mental 
retard range. See, Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, Vol. II, p. 211-212. 
2) There is significant evidence in Michael's history to justify a concern about his 
neuropsychological functioning. Id. at p. 229. 
3) Michael's history clearly demonstrates that there is organic brain damage. Id. at 48. 
4) Michael's history indicates that he suffered mental retardation. Id. at 93-94. 
5) Mr. Wood had the following psychological and personality assessments: Addendum, 
Department of Corrections 90-day Diagnostic Report, as Exhibit "35." 
a. Dr Long's diagnostic impressions indicate "conduct disorder, socialized 
aggression." 
b. The "Aggression Types are characterized by a repetitive and persistent pattern 
of aggressive conduct in which the rights of others are violated. This could be 
through the use of physical violence of persons or property outside the home 
involving confrontation with the victim." 
c. Wood was characterized as follows: "Low frustration tolerance, irritability 
and temper outbursts are often present." 
d. Dr. Long also suggested that Lance Wood had Narcissistic Personality 
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Disorder. 
e. Lance Wood's total IQ was 97, much higher than Michael's I.Q of 71 or 72. 
f. Lance Wood's father described him as "a con artist." He can usually get 
people to do whatever he wants just by manipulation." Addendum, Lance 
Wood's Presentence Report, as Exhibit "36." 
Furthermore, both Michael's parents and his sister, Stella Archuleta, testified that before 
Michael moved to Cedar City, Lance called them repeatedly trying to get a hold of Michael. 
Addendum, Affidavit of Stella Archuleta as Exhibit "37." This evidence clearly demonstrates 
that Wood was not scared of Michael as maintained by the State. Finally, Gary Hawkins, who 
knew both Wood and Michael from prison, has stated that of the two, Wood is much smarter and 
controlling. Wood is much more capable of formulating a plan to deceive the police. 
Addendum, Affidavit of Gary Hawkins, as Exhibit "30." 
Michael's trial counsel did not present any evidence regarding Lance Wood's 
psychological make-up, nor compare it to Michael's make-up. Trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel by failing to rebut the State's evidence that Michael was the aggressor and 
main actor in the murder. The fact that Brass did not fully explore and present this issue during 
his efforts in the post conviction relief process constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel and 
gross negligence. As such, Michael should be allowed to open up this matter to explore the 
claim in his post-conviction relief petition. 
6. Failure to Obtain Experts 
Michael's testimony at the trial was that Lance Wood had actually inflicted the injuries 
which led to Gordon Church's death. In support of this position, and to explain the blood found 
on his pants, Michael testified that the blood found was the result of carrying Gordon Church's 
dead body up a hill and placing him under a tree. Michael also testified that Church's blood may 
have been found on his clothing because he was close enough to Church while Wood inflicted 
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the injuries. Finally, Michael testified that he was actually able to stop Wood from repeatedly 
striking Church by grabbing the jack and tossing it from the scene. Addendum, Summary of 
Michael's testimony, as Exhibit "18." 
On the other hand, the State argued at Michael's trial and sentencing in support of the 
death sentence that the charge of capital murder was justified because "the death was committed 
in an especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved manner, any of which must 
be demonstrated by physical torture or serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the 
victim before death...", Addendum, Jury Instruction No. 12, as Exhibit "39." Furthermore, the 
State argued that the amount of blood found on his cloths meant that Michael had to have been 
involved in Church's murder to a greater extent than as he testified. The State also produced a 
blood expert who testified that Gordon Church's blood droplets covered the back of the vehicle 
and interior trunk lid of the vehicle. Exhibit "38" as Criminal Trial T. p. 2732. The blood expert 
testified that at the time Church was attacked, he was on the ground directly behind the vehicle's 
bumper (inches) on the driver's side. Id. at 2751. This is important because the blood spatter 
droplets from Gordon Church's body were towards the vehicle. No person could have safely 
stood between the victim and the trunk of the car except the person committing the actual attack. 
The State's blood spatter expert, Dr. Robert Bell, testified that he found blood spatter on Lance 
Wood's jacket. Id. at 2757. He further testified that the "blood source [found on Wood's jacket] 
would have to be slightly in front of his feet off at a distance... of anywhere from two to four 
feet in front of the wearer of [Lance's jacket] and slightly to the person's left." Id. at 2761-62. 
No blood spatter was found on Michael, only found on Wood. Id. at 2575-2576. A very viable 
conclusion that can be made from this testimony is that Wood committed the injuries inflicted on 
Church, otherwise blood spatter would have been found on Michael's clothing. 
62 
In addition, Michael testified that he stopped Lance Wood from further striking Gordon 
Church. Addendum, Summary of Michael's testimony, as Exhibit u18." The blood spatter 
expert provided testimony which supports Michael's testimony as follows: 
There appears to be a single, isolated drop of what appears to be blood striking the jacket 
from, again, the up to down trajectory. And it appears as though it would be if you were 
standing upright, it would have been coming over in this area here, to the right of the 
individual. It's probably more consistent with a drop of blood as a result of parabolic 
arcing." 
Q: "Could it be a drop of blood falling from an instrument?" 
A: "Yes." 
Exhibit "38," Criminal Trial Transcript, p. 2772 
This testimony supports Michael's testimony regarding his involvement and that he 
stopped Wood in mid-swing when Wood was attacking Church. The weapon, car jack, was 
clearly stopped while being held upwards over Wood's head allowing for a drop of blood to fall 
on Wood's shirt. This particular testimony clearly supports Michael's testimony that he stopped 
Wood from striking Church, either physically or by yelling, 
Also in support of Michael's trial testimony, there was abundant forensic evidence that 
indicated that Wood had committed the murder. For example, Church's hair was entwined in 
Wood's shoelaces and that Wood's footprint matched the indentation in Church's head. 
Addendum, State vs. Wood, as Exhibit "17." On the other hand, the State's forensic evidence 
regarding Michael's involvement was limited to the blood found on Michael's pants. 
In response to the evidence produced by the State, Michael's counsel did not produce any 
expert testimony which could have established that Michael's testimony of what occurred was 
credible, or even plausible. Expert testimony should have been produced to explain that the 
blood on Michael's pants, was consistent with his testimony that he carried Church away from 
the spot where and after the injuries to Church had been inflicted. Esplin should have retained an 
expert to testify that the blood spatter found on Wood's clothes and on Wood's shoes and the 
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other forensic evidence was consistent with Wood delivering the blows to Church, that the single 
drop of blood on Wood's shirt was consistent with Michael's testimony that he stopped Wood at 
one point from repeatedly delivering blows to Church with the tire jack and that the blood on 
Michael's pants was consistent with him carrying Church after he had been murdered. 
The undersigned has retained a blood spatter expert for consultation purposes and he has 
verified that Michael's testimony would support Michael's position regarding the source of 
blood on his clothing and his involvement in the case. The consultant further indicated that in 
1989, blood spatter expert testimony was a relatively new science. For this reason, Michael 
should have retained his own expert for consultation. Finally, the consultant stated that for a 
blood spatter expert, 40 hours of training is very basic. Addendum, Affidavit of James K. 
Slavens, as Exhibit "26." 
In another line of reasoning that Brass/Esplin should have retained an expert, if Gordon 
Church was already dead or unconscious during much of the attack, the State would have failed 
to establish that the death was caused in a heinous manner. Instead, the State would have only 
established the crime of abuse or desecration of a dead human. See Utah Code §76-9-704. 
Michael's defense should have retained an expert to review the evidence and render an opinion 
as to the theory that Church was already dead or had lost feeling prior to a substantial part of the 
attack. Clearly, the testimony presented at trial indicated that several of Church's injuries could 
have resulted in death and/or unconsciousness. The State's witnesses testified as follows: 1) 
"these injuries were crushing skull fractures," Exhibit "38" as Criminal Trial Transcript p. 
3151"; 2) "so he died fairly quick from the head injuries, id. at p. 3183; 3) "In fact, not only is it 
probable- or is it possible, it's probable that Church immediately lost [consciousness]; is it not? 
A. yes," id. at p.3190; 4) "Now, as a result of losing consciousness, does the person also lose 
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feelings? A. That's generally—you lose pain—feeling the pain, as a general rule," id. at p. 3191; 
5) the State's expert would not give an opinion "whether Church lost consciousness," id. at 3201. 
We do not know which injury caused the death and whether Gordon Church was dead or 
unconscious during much of the attack. The State certainly had no interest in establishing that 
Church may have died or lost feeling during most of the attack. 
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981), cert, 
denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982), Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), and State v. Tuttle, 780 
P.2d 1203 (Utah 1989), has stressed the importance of narrowing the classification of capital 
cases in order to distinguish them from other ruthless, brutal murders. The initial head injuries to 
Mr. Gordon Church were sufficient and probably caused him to lose consciousness at the outset. 
If so, the victim would not have suffered any additional pain and suffering once he lapsed into a 
state of unconsciousness. Thus, pursuant to Wood, since Gordon had lost consciousness or had 
died prior to most of the attack, this case is distinguishable from other ruthless and brutal 
murders. 
In addition, in support of its position that the crime was committed in a heinous, cruel or 
atrocious manner, the State presented evidence that Michael was involved in hooking battery 
cables to Gordon Church's testicles. The State presented this evidence regarding the use of 
battery cables to demonstrate that Michael attempted to "electrocute" Gordon Church. It is 
important to note that hooking up battery cables to Church's testicles is the only offensive act, 
testified to by Michael, that he made towards Church at Dog Valley where the murder occurred. 
Addendum, Exhibit "38," Trial Transcript, p. 3269-3270. The jury should have been informed 
during the guilt and penalty phase of the fact that Church could not have suffered any electrical 
shock from a car battery. The vehicle would have to be running in order to produce any 
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electrical charge. Addendum, Affidavit of Kevin Tracy as Exhibit "40." Furthermore, a vehicle 
battery's output is only twelve (12) volts whereas a typical wall outlet in a home is one-hundred 
and ten (110) volts. Twelve (12) volts is not a substantial enough electrical output to create 
anything more than a slight tingle and would not cause any injury. In fact, whether the vehicle 
was running at the time Michael attached battery cables to Church's testicles, or whether the 
ignition was off, there would be no shock, burn or injury under either set of facts. Id 
The Trial Court found that it did not believe that any expert suggested by the Appellant 
would have changed the verdict in either the guilt or penalty phase. See generally R. p. 4896 at 
p. 70-72. First, as argued herein, the Court applied the wrong standard; second, because of 
Brass5 conflict of interest, this Court should simply presume prejudice; and third, the Trial 
Court's reasoning is in error because we actually have a jury that was presented the same 
"aggravating evidence" that Wood and Archuleta were co-conspirators and evidence of the "utter 
brutality and callousness of the murder" that found for a life sentence instead of the death 
sentence. The position that "a single juror" would not have altered his/her verdict cannot be 
supported because we have a jury that did just that; impose a life sentence. 
The fact that Michael's trial counsel failed to retain experts to address the above issues, 
amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel as was stated in Sears, supra Section A3. This is 
important in that the Appellant's Motion is based upon the fact that Brass did not explore this 
issue regarding experts in the Second Amended Petition for post conviction relief This again 
amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel or gross negligence. This Court should grant 
Michael's Motion to open the Court's denial of post-conviction relief so that this issue can be 
explored. 
7. Mental Breakdown of State's Forensic Pathologist Amounts to Brady Violation 
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Martha Kerr ("Kerr") was a Forensic Pathologist for the Utah State Crime Lab and called 
by the State as an expert on the blood evidence presented at Michael's criminal trial. Her office 
handled the chain of evidence, the blood typing, and more importantly the blood spatter evidence 
in this case. The blood evidence was the only substantial physical/forensic evidence putting 
Michael at the scene of the crime. Michael has recently discovered that Kerr experienced a 
mental breakdown prior to her trial testimony. This fact was never disclosed to Michael and 
amounts to a Brady violation. 
The following denotes Kerr's history in regards to her mental illness: 
1. In July 1987, Kerr experienced her first of many psychiatric hospital stays. 
Addendum, September 14, 1999 letter, as Exhibit "41 " 
2. In February 1988, Kerr experienced a second psychiatric episode that again 
required the attention of professional mental health treatment. Id. 
3. In June 1989, Kerr resigned from the crime lab. Id. 
4. Sometime in 1989, Kerr had a major breakdown while providing a deposition by 
Fred Metos, Defense Attorney in another Capital case, and required mental health treatment. Id. 
5. Kerr was taking medication to treat her mental illness. Id 
6. Kerr ultimately obtained a Worker's Comp claim based on her mental health case. 
Id. 
7. Kerr is on Social Security disability based upon her diagnosis of Schizophrenia, 
paranoid and other functional psychotic disorders. Id. 
Kerr has stated that she feels a number of files of which she worked between 1984 and 
1989 had been altered. Addendum, May 4, 2007 letter, as Exhibit "42." A letter dated April 10, 
2007 from Kerr to Tom Stevenson, a Prosecuting Attorney in the Brad Perry homicide in Box 
Elder, reads as follows* 
"In conclusion, due to apparent technical and nontechnical forgery, falsification, 
and manipulation of case log books and reports represented as those I generated during 
my time with the Utah State Crime Laboratory and the destruction of crucial records for 
the period of time under review by both the Laboratory and the Bureau of Criminal 
Identification, specifically, the sign-in sheets for the 2nd floor Calvin L. Hampton 
Complex and the Laboratory's own sign-in log, I would ask that my name be removed 
from the witness list on this new evidence and case. 
Furthermore, I recommend a more extensive scientific examination and 
investigation should be conducted not only with the Brad Perry homicide in mind but 
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also, any others I worked on that are affected." 
Kerr was the forensic blood expert in this case and testified at trial regarding the blood 
evidence found at the crime scene, on the vehicle and on Wood's and Archuleta's clothes. 
Addendum, Exhibit u38.," Clearly, Kerr was under duress and under the influence of medication 
because of her mental illnesses during her analysis of the evidence and during her testimony at 
Michael's trial. Her statements since the trial indicates that she is of the opinion that the 
evidence in this case and others were falsified and/or fabricated and needs review. 
Regardless of whether Kerr is now credible or believable, the State had the obligation to 
disclose to Michael that Kerr had this mental breakdown and was under the influence of 
medicine. This failure amounts to a Brady violation. See discussion in Section Bl above. 
The Trial Court found that "even if Kerr's testing of the blood and testimony at trial are 
suspect, ultimately it was not material to the resolution of the case." R. p. 4896 at p. 73. 
However, the blood evidence is very significant in deciding between the State's theory and 
Michael's theory of the case. The Trial Court found, in addressing another claim, that because of 
the amount of blood found on Michael's pants, he must have been an active participant in the 
murder. See R. p. 4896 at p. 58: "which was in turn supported by physical evidence that 
Petitioner 'had a great deal of blood on his pants,' the jury could have found Petitioner guilty 
notwithstanding evidence contained in the Hawkins declaration." Quoting Archuleta, 850 P 2d at 
1236. The Trial Court's position, which adopted the Respondent's position, that the blood 
evidence is not important because of all the other evidence supporting the heinousness of 
Church's death, succinctly demonstrates the circular nature of the State's case and the house of 
cards upon which Michael's conviction and sentence rests. For example, the Trial Court found 
that the Hawkin's affidavit, as well as the other witnesses' testimony regarding Wood's 
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confessions, is not relevant because of the amount of blood found on Michael's pants; however, 
Martha Kerr's mental breakdown is not important because the amount of blood found on 
Michael's pants is not relevant; and finally that Michael did not need to retain a blood expert 
"whose testimony will add little, if anything, to effective cross-examination and cogent 
arguments based upon the evidence" because the blood evidence is not important. R. p. 4896 at 
p. 68. 
The State's Brady violation regarding the disclosure of Marth Kerr's mental breakdown 
coupled with the other errors identified herein establishes that Michael is entitled to post-
conviction relief and/or to have the Trial Court's denial of Michael's post-conviction relief set 
aside. 
8. Brass9 Failure to Respond to the Sate's Motion for Summary Judgment that Claims 
1-30 were Procedurally Barred Constitutes Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Michael filed his First Amended Petition on or about August 11, 1994. In response, the 
State filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the 
District Court. However, Michael appealed the District Court's order granting summary 
judgment to the Utah Supreme Court, which overturned the District Court holding that the 
"district court erred in ruling that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which was based on the 
allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal, was barred." Archuleta 
v.Galetka, 960 P. 2d 399 (Utah 1998). See, Addendum, Exhibit "7." When Michael filed his 
Second Amended Petition, which included the same claims 1 through 30 as were presented in the 
First Amended Petition, the State again moved for summary judgment, which Brass did not 
oppose. The District Court, in its Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment, entered on or about 
August 25, 2004, recognized that "Claims 1 through 30 in the second amended petition were all 
previously raised in Appellant's first amended petition filed on August 11, 1994." Addendum, 
Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment, as Exhibit "14." The District Court granted the 
State's unopposed motion for summary judgment regarding Claims 1 through 30, holding that 
"with the exception of the Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the [Utah 
Supreme] Court left undisturbed Judge Davis's [district court] ruling that the other claims in the 
first amended petition were procedurally barred." Id. 
However, a reading of the three cases cited by the Supreme Court makes it clear that the 
Trial Court misinterpreted this Court's ruling. This Court made clear in Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 
873 (1990), one of the cases cited, that u[t]he doctrines of waiver and res judicata do not stand as 
an unyielding bar to the litigation of claims that either once were or could have been litigated in a 
prior proceeding." Id. at 875. The Court further explained that the function of a writ of habeas 
corpus as a post-conviction remedy serves as a collateral attack to constitutionally flawed 
convictions and that "[protection of life and liberty from unconstitutional procedures is of 
greater importance than is res judicata." Id. 
Certainly this Court did not intend for its silence in its ruling, reversing and remanding 
the Judge Davis' summary judgment order, to be interpreted as an affirmation of the dismissal of 
counts 1-30 on the grounds that such claims were waived by Michael by failing to raise them 
during the direct appeal. This Court instead clearly stated that litigation of claims of 
unconstitutional procedures are "of greater importance than is res judicata." Id. This language 
does not imply that claims 1-30 were procedurally barred. 
Accordingly, the District Court erred in granting summary judgment finding that claims 1 
through 30 were procedurally barred. Brass provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing 
to defend against the State's motion for summary judgment as to Claims 1 through 30. In 
addition, Brass should have reviewed and sought to reintroduce claims 1 through 30 of the 
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Second Amended Petition Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15, claiming "ineffective 
assistance of counsel." 
9. Brass Prejudiced Michael by Introducing Prejudicial, Rather than Mitigating 
Evidence. 
Essentially, Brass5 approach in the Second Amended Petition boiled down to arguing that 
the trial counsel should have introduced evidence that Michael's history created a monster-like 
person that would inevitably kill and that Michael was damaged to the point that he cannot be 
rehabilitated. As mentioned in Section 1 above, and supported by the affidavit of Michael, 
Brass did not discuss with nor receive permission from Michael to pursue this strategy. 
Obviously, employing a strategy during the post conviction relief appeal that is diametrically 
opposed to Michael's testimony during the trial is, to say the least, ineffective and prejudicial to 
Michael's interests. 
Judge Eyre, in dismissing Michael's post-conviction relief, noted the contradicting 
positions taken by Michael. During his criminal trial, Michael claimed he did not participate in 
Church's murder. Yet the mitigation evidence indicated that because of his upbringing, he was 
destined to murder. Such contradicting mitigation evidence was prejudicial to Michael and 
perhaps solidified the appropriateness of the death sentence. The District Court found that 
Brass' theory of mitigation at the penalty phase amounted to essentially asking the jury to find 
him "less morally culpable for a murder he specifically told the jury he did not commit," and that 
much of the evidence Brass contends should have been presented was tctwo-edged," that "it 
would likely have been interpreted as aggravating rather than mitigating insofar as it strongly 
suggests that [Michael] would be dangerous in the future. " [Emphasis added] In other words, 
the argument advanced by Brass for Michael's post conviction relief was more helpful to the 
State then it was to Michael. 
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Brass5 actions amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel and supports the Appellant's 
Rule 60 and 59 Motions. 
C. Cumulative Error Spanning Twenty Years Warrants Post Conviction Relief 
Even if this Court finds that no single error occurred, the undersigned contends that the 
trial court's errors, as well as Brass' ineffective assistance of counsel, constitute cumulative error. 
In State v. Gonzales, 125 P.3d 878 (2005), the Court held that pursuant to the "cumulative error 
doctrine, we will reverse only if the "cumulative effect" of the several errors undermines our 
confidence . . . that a fair trial was had." 
In assessing a cumulative error claim, the Court must "consider all the identified errors, 
as well as any other errors [the court] assumes may have occurred," to determine if the errors 
undermined confidence that the Appellant/Michael had a fair trial. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1229 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted); see also, State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 367 (Utah 1993). 
The errors enumerated herein certainly undermine any confidence that the 
Appellant/Michael received a fair trial and/or a fair sentence. Consequently, Michael is entitled 
to a post-conviction relief. In fact, the Trial Court and this Court have already held that the 
following errors occurred: 
(1) This Court found that the prosecutor violated his duty to engage in continuous 
discovery by failing to disclose to Michael the substance of Anna Luce's testimony that he was 
wearing a knife in a scabbard strapped to his right hip when she saw in the evening of the 
murder. However, the Court found that this was harmless error. Utah vs. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 
1232, 1242. 
(2) This Court also found that the trial court improperly directed verdict, in the guilt 
phase, to the issue of whether or not the murder occurred in the commission of, or flight after 
committing the crime of object rape. The Court indicated that even with this circumstance 
eliminated, Michael's conviction of capital murder stands because the jury found three other 
circumstances. Id. at 1245. 
(3) This Court also found that the trial court improperly admitted evidence, in the penalty 
phase, regarding object rape. The Court indicated that even with this aggravating circumstance 
eliminated, Michael's conviction of capital murder stands because the remaining aggravating 
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. Id. at 1245. 
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Michael recognizes that the Court cannot reconsider the findings that the errors 
enumerated above constituted harmless error as the issues have already been ruled upon on 
appeal However, this Court can take into account the errors found on appeal coupled with the 
errors found here in resolving the issue of whether or not Michael is entitled to his Rule 60(b) 
Motion and resolving the issue of whether a single juror could possibly have changed his/her 
position regarding Michael's conviction or sentence 
For the reasons provided herein, and those previously adjudicated, this Court should find 
cumulating error justifying Michael's Rule 60(b) Motion and also justify Post-Conviction Relief 
from his conviction and death sentence 
D. Lack of Competent Counsel 
This Court, in Archuleta v. Galetka, 197 P 3d 650 (2008), held as follows 
"We find that the unavailability of competent and willing counsel impedes prompt, 
constitutionally sound resolution in capital cases, we may be forced to hold that the lack of 
such counsel is sufficient grounds for outright reversal of a capital sentence and remand for 
the imposition of a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parol Id at 654 
As stated above, the cumulative effect of the errors made by Michael's counsel over the 
past twenty years is proof positive that Michael has not been afforded effective assistance of 
counsel as required by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States Many, if 
not all, of the errors outlined above cannot be corrected and have forever undermined any 
scintilla of confidence in the fairness of Michael's trial, conviction, and sentence necessary to 
impose the heaviest of all penalties - death 
During the trial, Michael's counsel, Michael Esplin, was ineffective for the reasons 
delineated in this motion and for those raised in the First and Second Amended Petitions for post 
conviction relief Michael's second attorney, Karen Chaney suffered a nervous breakdown 
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during her representation in this post conviction relief action. In fact, this Court revoked her 
right to practice in Utah on a pro hoc vice status. Addendum, Various Court Documents, as 
Exhibits "9," "10," "11," and "12 " Michael's third attorney, Brass, failed to provide effective 
assistance of counsel for all the reasons set forth above. Previously the Supreme Court 
characterized, as stated above, Brass' representation in a previous post conviction relief case as 
"deplorable," and Brass himself admitted that he "had no training in federal habeas law," and 
that he does "not understand the complex procedural rules governing capital cases in state and 
federal post-conviction." Addendum, Affidavit of Ed Brass as Exhibit "16." 
The undersigned is now Michael's fourth appointed attorney. The undersigned is 
overwhelmed by the responsibility of reviewing over 20 years of representation, especially in 
light of the fact that many of the files cannot be found and of which are not accounted. In 
essence, the undersigned cannot imagine how this Court could find that there is any effective 
means to provide meaningful representation for Michael or a review of his representation at this 
point. This Court cannot have any confidence that Michael has received effective assistance of 
counsel. The history of this case speaks for itself. This is such a case that this Court should hold 
that the unavailability of counsel has impeded a sound resolution of this capital offense. This 
lack of counsel is sufficient grounds for revoking Michael's sentence of death and imposing a 
life sentence. 
E. Exhaustion of State Remedies 
Finally, the Court should grant Archuleta's Rule 59 and 60 motions for the purpose of 
addressing all of his claims for the sake of judicial economy. As this court is well aware, the 
federal courts, based on the principle of comity, will not entertain issues presented for post 
conviction relief until the Appellant has exhausted his state remedies. See, Tillman v. Cook, 215 
74 
R3d 1116(2000). 
The exhaustion of remedies doctrine prevents Michael from seeking a remedy for the 
claims set forth above in Federal Courts until all his claims or remedies have been exhausted in 
Utah's state courts. Should this Court refuse to set aside its grant of summary judgment in this 
matter to allow Michael the opportunity to amend his Petition for Post Conviction Relief to 
include the above stated Brady, Atkins and ineffective assistance of counsel claims, it is almost 
certain that the Federal Courts will remand the case to the state court for adjudication or bar 
review altogether. See, 28 U.S.C. 2254; see also, Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986)(those 
seeking collateral relief in federal court have an obligation to exhaust state remedies before 
seeking relief in federal court). 
The State, which the Trial Court adopted, disagrees arguing that it believes that the 
federal courts will not, as a matter of federal law, allow Petitioner to return to the Utah courts to 
seek relief on his claims. It asserts that his claims will not be cognizable in federal court as a 
matter of federal law. R. p. 4648, Opposition at 125, citing 28 U.S.C. T 2254(a). The State 
argues that the federal courts will not reach the merits of his claims in any event because the 
federal doctrines of exhaustion and procedural default would prevent it from doing so. Id. at 
125-26, citing 28 U.S.C. T 2254(b); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); Gardner v. 
Galetka, 568 F.3d 864 (10th Cir. 2009)). Finally, it asserts that it may waive the exhaustion 
requirement with respect to these claims once Petitioner files a federal habeas petition. Id. at 
127, citing 28 U.S.C. T 2254(b)(3). 
The State's contentions, thus the Trial Court's ruling, based on federal law are irrelevant 
for two reasons. First, they are questions of federal law, not state law, and the Trial Court had no 
authority to pass on them. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (noting that whether 
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to use the stay-and-abeyance procedure is within the discretion of a federal district court); 
Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 455 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that procedural 
default is a question of federal law); Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842-43 (1999) (noting 
that exhaustion is a question of federal law). Second, the State=s positions are inherently 
speculative. The State presumes that Petitioner's claims will reach the federal courts having 
never been previously presented to the Utah state courts. But that presumption is demonstrably 
untrueCPetitioner is raising them now, before the Trial Court and now this Court, in his motions 
and appeal pursuant to Rules 59 and 60. This Court should not presume to predetermine how the 
federal courts will apply federal exhaustion and procedural-default rules to the procedural 
posture in which Petitioner is presenting his claims to this Court. Guessing how a federal court 
sitting in habeas would treat a claim that has never before been presented to the state courts 
cannot be considered in determining whether this Court should exercise the discretion afforded it 
now pursuant to Utah state and procedure law and whether it should conduct further proceedings 
as necessary to reach the merits of his claims. 
To be sure, assuming that Appellant presents his Brady, Atkins, and Wiggins claims to the 
federal courts in a federal habeas petition, the federal courts will have to decide whether Rules 
59 and 60 are vehicles that are "available" as a matter of Utah law for presenting those claims for 
adjudication on the merits. Cf. Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 847-48; Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F 3d 1008, 
1010-11 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing State v. Sandon, 111 P.2d 220, 221 (Ariz. 1989); State v. 
Shattuck, 684 P 2d 154, 157 (Ariz. 1984)). Appellant submits that it would be more economical 
for this Court to express a view on that question now, before he files a federal habeas petition, so 
that he will not have to return to state Court to ask for its views after he has filed a federal habeas 
petition. This Court would also thereby help to resolve an unsettled question of Utah procedure 
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that has emerged in the wake oiMemies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 150 P 3d 480, and provide 
guidance to the federal courts that will ultimately be required to determine whether the principles 
of federal-state comity that drive the exhaustion requirement will permit them to afford 
Appellant merits review of his claims in that forum 
In the interest of judicial economy, this Court should grant the Appellant's Rule 60 and 
Rule 59 Motion for the purpose of exploring issues raised herein. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons provided herein, this Court should set aside the Trial Court's order 
denying the relief sought in the Second Amended Petition for post conviction relief and allow 
Michael to pursue the claims raised and alluded to herein, or grant him post-conviction relief, 
and for any and all other relief deemed just and proper. 
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